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RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF EQUITABLE
INTERESTS IN MICHIGAN PROPERTY*
William F. Fratchert
N the Middle Ages a conveyance of land to a monastic corporation
resulted in a serious loss of income to the feudal overlord. As such
corporations never died, the overlord ceased to receive the reliefs payable on the death of a tenant and to enjoy the feudal incidents of
wardship and marriage of minor heirs. Monks could not be compelled
to perform military services and it was difficult or impossible to compel a monastery to perform other services incident to tenure. The
twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw great expansion in monastic land
holdings and consequent loss to the king and other overlords in income and military strength. A statute was enacted in 1279 to put an
end to conveyances to monastic corporations without the consent of the
injured overlords. It provided that, when such a conveyance was
made, the overlord might enter within the year and forfeit the tenant's
estate.526
The great Benedictine and Cistercian orders, which specialized in
agriculture, already owned many estates and probably were not greatly
hurt by the new statute.526 Their corporate wealth enabled them to
pay for licenses from the overlords to purchase land. The newer
Dominican and Franciscan orders of friars, who preached and ministered unto the poor, the sick and the aged in towns, much like the
modem Salvation Army, were, however, hampered in their efforts to
acquire sites for hospitals and homes for the poor and aged. To avoid
the statute they resorted to the device of having land conveyed to the
municipal corporation, which agreed informally to allow them to use
it.527 That this palpable evasion of the statute of 1279 was tolerated
for over a century was probably due to the facts that the friars usually

I

""The writer is indebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan
Law Faculty for guidance and advice in the preparation of this article. It supplements
the writer's earlier article, "Restraints on Alienation of Legal Interests in Michigan Property," 50 MICH. L. REv. 675-736, 793-836, 1017-1046 (1952). References in the footnotes to notes numbered below 525 "supra" are to the earlier article.
t Member, Michigan Bar; Professor of Law, University of Missouri.-Ecl.
625 Statute of Mortmain, 7 Edw. I, stat. 2 (1279).
526 The Cistercians, for example, reached England in 1127, built a hundred monasteries in the century which followed, and added only one between 1227 and the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII. Butler, "Cistercians," ENCYCLOPAEDIA BnrrANNICA, 11th ed. (1910). It would seem from this that the order had reached its full
development some fifty years before the Statute of Mortmain.
627 MArn.ANo, EQUITY, 2d ed., 24-25 (1936). The use device seems to have been
known before the statute. See Quency v. Prior of Barnwell, Bract., N.B., pl. 999 (1224).
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acquired only relatively small parcels in towns, rather than large tracts
of agricultural land, and that their activities were of recognized public
benefit. The friars' deyice was deprived of its efficacy by a statute
of 1391, which attacked it from two directions by providing that conveyances to municipal corporations should be within the statute of 1279
and that conveyances to anyone to the use of religious persons should
also be within that statute.528
Long before 1391 the advantage of the use device to lay landowners
was seen and it was adopted by their conveyancers. An elderly landowner whose heir was a minor daughter could avoid the onerous feudal
burdens of relief, wardship and marriage which would otherwise arise
upon his death by conveying to several young friends as joint tenants
to hold to the use of himself and his heirs. The feudal dues incident
to death would not then arjse until the death of the last joint tenant
and even this could be avoided by adding new tenants as the original
ones died. The rule prohibiting devise of freehold estates529 could
be avoided by a conveyance to the use of the conveyor for life and
thereafter to such uses as he might by will appoint.530 The Wars of
the Roses, with their frequent changes of dynasty and numerous prosecutions for treason, gave every politically active landowner a strong
motive for placing the title to his land in the names of persons who
were unlikely to be attainted of treason, since attainder involved forfeiture of all lands to the Crown.531 Conveyances to the use of laymen were not interfered with by legislation for some two centuries,
except to the extent that they were used to defraud creditors or to defeat a reversioner's action for waste.532 It would seem that most of the
land in England was conveyed to uses during this period.533
The common law courts would not enforce the rights of the cestui
que use or beneficiary against the feoffee to uses, who held the legal
title.534 From the end of the fourteenth century, however, the lord
528 Stat. 15 Ric. II, c. 5, §§5, 7 (1391). See 23 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1531).
529 2 POLLOCK AND MA:rn.AND, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw B:nFoRE THE TIMI! oF
EnwARD I, 312-328 (1895); note 8 supra.
530 Bacon thought that this was the chief reason for the rise of the use device. READING UPON THE STATOT.E OF Us:ns 20-21 (ed. 1804). See MArrr.ANI>, EQUITY, 2d ed., 2526 (1936); JENKS, SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH I.Aw, new ed., 104 (1934); SULLIVAN,
HISTORICAL TREATISll ON THE FEUDAL I.Aw 166-167 (1772); Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 4
(1487); 7 Hen. VII, c. 3 (1490); 3 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1511).
531 SANDERs, UsEs AND TRUSTS, 5th ed., 16-17 (1844).
532 Stat. 50 Edw. III, c. 6, §2 (1376); 1 Ric. II, c. 9 (1377); 4 Hen. IV, c. 7
· (1402); 11 Hen. VI, cc. 3, 5 (1433).
5331 CoKE, INS'I'ITOT.Es *272a; SANDERS, UsEs AND TnusTs, 5th ed., 17 (1844).
534 Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, Pasch., pl. 9 (1464).
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high chancellors, who were nearly always bishops, did so.535 After
some hesitation, the chancellors undertook to enforce the use against
the heir of the feoffee to uses536 and against persons to whom the feoffee
conveyed the legal title, if they had notice of the use or had not paid
a valuable consideration.537 As the cestui que use was nearly always
in actual possession of the land, it followed as a practical matter that
the feoffee to uses could not convey the legal title free of the use.
The use device was intended to give the cestui que use all the
advantages of full ownership of the land, less some of the burdens of
ownership, and with the additional power of devising his interest. In
its enforcement of uses the High Court of Chancery brought this intention to full realization. It enforced estates in uses, in fee simple,
in fee tail, for life and for years, which corresponded to the legal estates
in land.538 Estates in expectancy by way of reversion, remainder and
springing and shifting use were possible. The estate of the cestui que
use was devisable by wil1539 and alienable inter vivos.540 By a statute
of 1483 he was empowered to convey the legal title without the consent of its holder.541 Thus the cestui que use had greater powers of
alienation than a legal owner.
Then, in 1535, the Statute of Uses converted the equitable estate
of the cestui que use into a legal estate of like quantity.542 This put
an end to uses as such. Nevertheless, in the two centuries which followed, the High Court of Chancery developed three types of equitable
estates which resembled the old use in many respects and had most
of its characteristics, the trust, the equity of redemption, and the vendee's interest under an executory land contract. These three have much
in common but the latter two differ from the former in that the legal
title of the mortgagee and the vendor is, in part, beneficial to him,
whereas that of the trustee is not. Hence separate treatment is desirable.
535 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399); Ames, "Origin
of Uses and Trusts," 21 HARv. L. R.Bv. 261 at 262, 274 (1908); Brown, ''Ecclesiastical
Origin of the Use," 10 NoTRB DAME LAWYER 353 at 361-366 (1935).
536 Anonymous, Keilway 42, 72 Eng. Rep. 200 (1502).
537 Anonymous, Y.B. 11 Edw. IV, Trin., pl. 13 (1471); Anonymous, Y.B. 14 Hen.
VIII, Mich., pl. 5 (1523); Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham, 1 Dyer 7b, 73 Eng. Rep. 19
(1536). The arguments in this case are an elaborate discussion of the effect of a conveyance by the feoffee to uses.
538 TURNER, Tm, EQUITY OF lliIDEMPnON 7-8 (1931).
539Rothanhale v. Wychingham, 2 Cal. Proc. Ch. iii (1413-1422); Williamson v.
Cook, Sel. Cas. in Chan. (S.S.), pl. 118 (1417-1424); note 530 supra.
540 BACON, READING UPON TBE STATOTE oF UsEs 16 (1642); CRUISE, EssAY oN
UsEs §36 (1795); GILBERT, LAw oF UsEs AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 26 (1741); HoLl',ms,
CoMMoN LAw 408 (1881); SANDERS, EssAY ON UsEs AND TRusTs, 4th ed., 65 (1823).
541 Stat. 1 Ric. ill, c. 1 (1483).
542 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
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A. TheTrust
The Statute of Uses in terms deprived the High Court of Chancery
of all jurisdiction over uses created on freehold estates in land. It had
no application to estates for years and uses in chattels.543 Soon after
the enactment of the statute it was held that it did not apply, even
though the feoffee to uses had an estate of freehold, if the conveyance
imposed active duties upon him.544 A century after the statute the
High Court of Chancery began to enforce as an equitable estate, the
use on a use. 545 In these four situations, namely, those of estates for
years, chattels personal, active trusts, and the use on a use, relationships much like that of the old use were treated in Chancery as trusts.
The holder of the legal title was a trustee and the equitable beneficiary
a cestui que trust. The High Court of Chancery develop_,ed and enforced the rights of the cestui que trust by analogy to those of the old
cestui que use. In the law of trusts the development of equitable
estates and interests corresponding to legal estates and interests has
been more full and elaborate than that of estates in uses. As Lord
Mansfield said in a Chancery case,
"The forum where they are adjudged is the only difference
between trusts and legal estates. Trusts are here considered as
between cestuy que trust and trustee (and all claiming by,
through, or under them, or in consequence of their estates), as the
ownership or legal estate, except when it can be pleaded in bar of
the exercise of this right of jurisdiction. Whatever would be
the rule of law, if it was a legal estate, is applied in equity to a
trust estate ... the trust is the estate at law in this court, and governed by the same rules in general, as all real property is, by limitation ... cestuy que trust is actually and absolutely seised of the
freehold in consideration of this court; and therefore . . . the
legal consequences of an actual seisin of a freehold, shall, in this
cour,
t f o11ow ...."546
548 It should be noted that it is the freehold or non-freehold character of the legal
estate of the feoffee to uses or trustee which governs the applicability of the statute, not
the character of the estate of the cestui que use or cestui que trust. See BACON, READING!
UPON THB STATUTE 0l' UsEs 42 (1642); SANDERS, UsEs AND TnusTs, 4th ed., 87 (1823).
544 Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1545); Nevil v. Saunders,
1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686).
545 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (common law decision that
use on a use is not within the statute); Sambach v. Dalston, Tothill 188, 21 Eng. Rep.
164 (1634) (chancery decision that use on a use is enforceable in Chancery); Ames,
"Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 HAnv. L. RBv. 261 at 270-274 (1908).
546Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden 177, 223-226, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 670-671 (1759).
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The rules as to alienation by a trustee were the same as those which
applied to conveyances by a feoffee to uses.547 If the trustee conveyed
the trust property to a purchaser who had notice of the trust or who
had not paid value, the purchaser took subject to the trust.548 Moreover, unless, under the terms of the trust, the trustee had power to
make such a sale or power to appoint his own successor, the alienee
would be compelled to reconvey or to convey to a new trustee appointed
by the High Court of Chancery.549 The heir, devisee and levying
creditor of the trustee likewise took subject to the trust. 550 A bona
£.de purchaser for value of the legal estate of the trustee took free of
the trustll 51 but the trustee who conveyed to a bona £.de purchaser for
value in breach of trust would be compelled to make restjtution to the
trust estate by repurchasing the property or purchasing property of like
type and value.552 Thus the trust became a very effective means of
restraining alienation of the legal title to interests in land or chattels.
The trustee, however, does not hold his title beneficially. It is beneficial ownership, the actual right to use and enjoy land and goods, which
is the primary concern of the law of restraints on alienation.
The cestui que use was usually in possession of the land; the cestui
que trust normally is not in possession of the trust property. The
rights of the cestui que use were established by custom as a property
interest before the High Court of Chancery began to enforce them;
the rights of the cestui que trust were a creation of that court and so
appeared more like a chose in action than a property interest. Choses
in action were generally inalienable.553 In consequence of these differences between the estate of the cestui que use and the interest of the
547 Note

537 supra.
v. Smith, 1 Vern. 144, 23 Eng. Rep. 377 (1682, 1692); Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern. 271, 23 Eng. Rep. 775 (1692); Pye v. Gorge, 1 P. Wms. 128, 24 Eng.
Rep. 323 (1710).
549 Anonymous, 3 Swanst. 79n, 36 Eng. Rep. 781 (c. 1800); note 548 supra.
550 Heir, devisee or legatee: Mortimer v. Ireland, 6 Hare 196, 67 Eng. Rep. 1138
(1847); note 536 supra. The dower of the trustee's widow was also subject to the trust,
which meant, practically, that she had no dower. Noel v. Jevon, 2 Freeman 43, 22 Eng.
Rep. 1047 (1678); Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. Sr. 631 at 634, 28 Eng. Rep. 402 at 404
(1755). Creditor levying without notice of the trust: Newlands v. Newlands, 4 My. & Cr.
408, 41 Eng. Rep. 158 (1840); Whitworth v. Gaugain, 3 Hare 416, 67 Eng. Rep. 444
(1844).
551 See Bassett v. Nosworthy, Rep. temp. Finch 102, 23 Eng. Rep. 55 (1673); note
537 supra.
552 Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see Tipping v.
Piggot, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1711).
553 Ames, ''The Inalienability of Choses in Action," LECTURBS ON LEGAL HISTORY
210-218 (1913).
548 Bovey
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cestui que trust, the early decisions treated the interest of the beneficiary of a trust as a chose in action which could be transmitted by
will but was not transferable inter vivos.554 By the seventeenth century, however, the property analogy prevailed and a cestui que trust
could transfer his interest inter vivos as freely as he could an equivalent
legal estate.555
It having been determined that equitable estates and interests correspond to legal estates and interests of the same duration and that,
like legal estates and interests, they have an incident of alienability,
it would seem to follow that the rules which govern restraints on alienation of legal estates and interests apply as well to equitable estates and
interests of the same types. Such, with an exception which is more
apparent than real, was the English law. Restraints on alienation
assume two forms, the prohibition, which, if valid, would make a conveyance by the owner or a levy by his creditors wholly ineffective, leaving the ownership in him, and the penalty restraint, designed to penalize alienation by forfeiture of the interest or otherwise. Prohibitions
on alienation of legal interests in property are always void, whether the
property is land or chattels and whether the interest is perpetual, for
life or for a term. In England the same rule of nullity was applied to
prohibitions on alienation of the interest of a cestui que trust. 556 The
rule had one exception in that an effective prohibition could be imposed on alienation by a married woman of her separate equitable
estate.557 As Professor Gray has observed, this exception was not really
554Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827, Jenk. 245, 145 Eng. Rep. 172
(1580); Earl of Worcester v. Finch, 4 CoKE, lNs'I'lTUTEs 85, 2 Anderson 162, 123 Eng.
Rep. 600 (1600); HoLMBS, CoMMON I.Aw 409 (1881).
555Wannstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. R. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498 (1628).
556 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811); Jones v. Salter,
2 Russ. & M. 208, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1815); Barton v. Briscoe, Jae. 603, 37 Eng. Rep.
978 (1822); Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66, 57 Eng. Rep. 503 (1826); Woodmeston v.
Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831); Brown v. Pocock, 2 Russ. & M.
210, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1833). Other cases are collected in GRAY, REsTRAINTS ON
.ALmNATION, 2d ed., §§105-112, 134-168 (1895). If the cestui's interest is limited to a
right to support or to such sums as the trustees in their discretion choose to pay him, the
purchaser or creditor may not acquire much.
557 Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025 (1817); Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 377, 41 Eng. Rep. 147 (1840); Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627, 41 Eng.
Rep. 771 (1846). The restraint was effective, however, only while the woman was
married, ceasing upon her husband's death. Jones v. Salter; Barton v. Briscoe, note 556
supra. The Married Women (Restraint Upon Anticipation) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo.
VI, c. 78, §1(1), provides, "No restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached, or
purported to be attached, to the enjoyment of any property by a woman which could not
have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be of any effect after
the passing of this Act." This statute replaced a similar enactment which applied only to
restraints imposed after 1935. The Law Refonn (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act,
1935, 25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 30, §2.
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in conflict with the rule as to legal interests, since a married woman •
could not hold legal title to chattels at common law and could not convey her legal title to land by ordinary means.558 As to penalty restraints, the English equity rules likewise follow the rules at law. A
provision for forfeiture on any alienation of an equitable estate in fee
simple or an equivalent interest in chattels is void.559 A provision for
forfeiture on alienation of an equitable life estate is valid, whether the
alienation restrained be voluntary or involuntary, if the trust is created
by someone other than the life cestui.560 If, however, the cestui que
trust for life or years is the settlor of the trust, a provision for forfeiture
of his estate on involuntary alienation is void.561
Where it has not been affected by statute, American law follows,
in general, the English view as to the effect of a trust in restraining
alienation of the legal title to property. That is to say, a transfer by
the trustee under power expressly or impliedly granted by the instrument creating the trust conveys the property to the transferee free of
trust;562 a transfer by the trustee which violates the provisions of the
trust conveys the legal title but not necessarily free of the trust. If the
transfer is to a purchaser who has notice of the trust:5 63 or to a donee564
the transferee takes subject to the trust and may be compelled to reconvey to the trustee or to a successor trustee. If the transfer is to a
bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the trust, the transferee
takes free of the trust:5 65 but the trustee may be compelled to make
restitution to the trust estate.566
2d ed., §§140-141, 269 (1895).
G59Re Dugdale, [1888] 38 Ch. Div. 176; Corbett v. Corbett, [1888] 13 P. Div. 136,
14 P. Div. 7; GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON kmNATION, 2d ed., §20 (1895). As in the case of
legal estates in fee simple (as to which see note 128 supra) the rules as to restraints which
are limited as to proscribed alienees, are confused. GRAY, id., §§35-39.
560 Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (I 733). Numerous cases in
accord are collected in GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON kmNATION, 2d ed., §78 (1895).
56l Higinbotham v. Holme, 19 Ves. Jr. 88, 34 Eng. Rep. 451 (1812). Other cases
are collected in GRAY, RESTRAINTs ON kmNATION, 2d ed., §§91, 93-95. The validity of
a restraint on voluntary alienation of the life interest of a cestui que trust who is also the
settlor of the trust is doubtful. Id., §§96-100.
562 TnusTs RESTATEMENT §283 (1935); 2 ScOTT, LAw oF TnuSTS §283 (1939).
563 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §288 (1935); 2 ScOTT, LAw OF TRusTS §288 (1939).
The cases are collected in 1 PERRY, LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 7th ed. §217n (1929).
564 TRUSTS REsTATl!MENT §289 (1935); 2 ScOTT, LAw OF TRUSTS §289 (1939).
The cases are collected in ScOTT and in PERRY, note 563 supra.
565 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §284 (1935); 2 ScOTT, LAw oF TRUSTS §284 (1939).
The cases are collected in PERRY, supra note 563, §§2l8-221nn. One who purchases in
good faith and for value, without notice of the trust, from a transferee of the trustee who
had notice or who did not pay value, also takes free of the trust. TRUSTS REsTATEMENT
§287 (1935); 2 ScOTT, LAw oF TRUSTS §287 (1939).
566 TRuSTs RESTATEMENT §§202, 205, 208 (1935); 2 ScOTT, LAw oF TRUSTS
§§202, 205, 208 (1939). This is not so, generally, if the cestui que trust consented to the
558GRAY, RESTRAINTs ON kmNATION,
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As to penalty :i;estraints on alienation by the cestui que trust of his
equitable interest, American law likewise tends to follow the English
view. That is to say; provisions for forfeiture on alienation are generally void when annexed to an equitable estate in fee simple or an
interest in personal property of equivalent duration567 and they are
generally valid· when annexed to an equitable interest for life or
years.568 As to restraints on alienation by way of prohibition, however, the American law has diverged widely from the English and
from the rules governing restraints on legal interests. Where the only
interest of a cestui que trust is to receive the income from the trust
property for his life, part of his life, or a term of years, most American
courts will enforce specifically a provision in the instrument creating
the trust prohibiting the cestui que trust from transferring his interest
and his creditors from reaching it.569 This "spendthrift trust" doctrine is an extension of the English enforcement of prohibitions on
alienation of the equitable estates of married women but it is not restricted to married women or incompetents. Moreover, the American
decisions treat the interest of the cestui que trust under a trust for his
support as inalienable even in ·the absence of an express prohibition on
alienation. 570 As to equitable interests in fee simple, whether in present enjoyment or in expectancy, and interests in personal property of
like duration, there is considerable confusion in the American cases.571
The Restatement of Trusts takes the position that prohibitory restraints
on alienation of such interests are invalid except that where, by the
terms of the trust, the cestui que trust is entitled to have the income
paid to him for life or a term of years, and thereafter to have the trust
property conveyed to him or to those deriving title through him, a
prohibition on voluntary or involuntary alienation of the right to intransfer at or before the time it was made, even though there are valid prohibitory restraints on alienation by the cestui of his own interest. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §216;
Sco'IT, §216.
567TRUSTs REsTATEMENT
568

§150 (1935); 1

ScO'IT, LAw OF TRUSTS

§150 (1939).

Ibid.

569TRuSTs RESTATEMENT §152 (1935); 1 ScO'IT, LAw oF TRUSTS §152 (1939).
The cases are collected and discussed in ScO'IT, §§152.1 to 152.6 and GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§53-60 (1947).
570TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §154 (1935); 1 Sco'IT, LAw oF TRuSTs §154 (1939);
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRil'T TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§430 to 434 (1947). This is not so where the
amount to be paid or applied by the trustee is a specified sum or is not limited to what is
necessary for the education and support of the cestui que trust, even though the primary
purpose of the trust is support. TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, comment d; GRISWOLD, §433.
5711 Sco'IT, LAw oF TRuSTs §§153-153.3 (1939); GRISWOLD, S.eENDTHRil'T
TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§81-97, 102-106 (1947).
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come accruing during his life is valid.572 Spendthrift trust prohibitions
are generally treated as ineffective against claims for necessaries supplied the cestui que trust, for services and supplies which preserve or
benefit his interest in the trust, and for support or alimony of his wife
and chilclren.573 They are considered invalid as to a trust created by
the cestui que trust himself. 574
During the years 1825 through 1828 a commission of three eminent
lawyers prepared a revision of the statutes of the State of New York
which, with some changes, was adopted by the legislature and published as the Revised Statutes of 1829, effective January 1, 1830.575
According to tradition, the plan of the revision was drafted by Judge
Henry Wheaton, a lifelong admirer of France, who had studied civil
law at Poitiers and translated the Code Napoleon into English. The
revisers' notes, which discuss the history of uses and trusts in England,
reB.ect this inB.uence. They admit that uses had utility in relieving
the burdens of the feudal system and introducing B.exibility in conveyancing but they compare unfavorably the complexity of the English
law caused by divided titles, legal and equitable, with the simple property provisions of the Code Napoleon, and deplore the extent to which
the High Court of Chancery nullified the Statute of Uses. The revisers thought that, if all feudal tenures and their incidents were abolished and a simple system of conveying legal title was provided, there
would be no need for uses or trusts, except those for the benefit of
creditors and for the protection of incompetents.576 They accordingly
proposed a "modified abolition of uses and trusts," saying,
"As the creation of trusts is always in a greater or less degree
the source of inconvenience and expense, by embarrassing the
Sections 151, 153 (1935).
REsTATBMENT §157 (1935); 1 Scarr, I.Aw oF TRuSTs §§157-157.3
(1939); GruswoLD, SPENDTmUFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., c. 6 (1947). Section 157 of the Restatement of Trusts was amended by the 1948 Supplement to add claims by the United
States or a state or subdivision thereof, to the list of claims against which spendthrift
provisions are ineffective.
574 TRusTs REsTATBMENT §156 (1935); 1 Scarr, I.Aw oF TRUSTS §§156-156.3
(1939); GruswoLD, SPENDTmUFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., c. 8, §282.1 (1947).
5 75 Preface, R.S.N.Y. 1829; 3 R.S.N.Y. 1829, 409 (ed. 1836); BUTLER, THB REVISION
OF THE STATU'I'Bs oF THE STATB OF NBw YoRK AND THB REvisBRs (1889). The original
commission consisted of John Duer, Benjamin F. Butler and Henry Wheaton. Judge Wheaton
accepted a diplomatic appointment in 1827 and was replaced by John C. Spencer. Butler later
served as Attorney General under Jackson. Wheaton was reporter of the United States
Supreme Court, had a long career as a diplomat, and became an authority on international
law. Duer later became a New York judge. Spencer was Secretary of War and of the
Treasury under Tyler.
576 3 R.S.N.Y., 579-587 (ed. 1836).
572

573 TRuSTs
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title, and requiring the frequent aid of a court of equity, it is
desirable that express trusts should be limited as far as possible,
and the purposes for which they may be created, strictly defined.
The object of the Revisers in this section is to allow the creation
of express trusts, in those cases and in those cases only where the
purposes of the trust require that the legal estate should pass to
the trustees. An assignment for the benefit of creditors, would in
most cases be entirely defeated, if the title were to remain in the
debtor, and where the trust is to receive the rents and profits of
lands, and to apply them to the education of a minor, the separate use of a married woman, or the support of a lunatic or spendthrift, (the general objects of trusts of this description) the utility
of vesting the title and possession in the trustees, is sufficiently
apparent. After much reflection, the Revisers have not been able
to satisfy themselves that there are any cases not enumerated in
this section, in which, in order to secure the execution of the
trust, it is necessary that the title or possession should vest in the
trustees. . . ."577
As enacted in 1828, the New York Revised Statutes provided,
"S. 45. Uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified
in this Article, are abolished; and every estate and interest in
lands, shall be deemed a legal right, cognizable as such in the
courts of law, except when otherwise provided in this Chapter.
"S. 47. Every person, who, by virtue of any grant, assignment or devise, now is, or hereafter shall be entitled to the actual
possession of lands, and the receipt of the rents and profits thereof,
in law or in equity, shall be deemed to have a legal estate therein,
of the same quality and duration, _and subject to the same conditions, as his beneficial interest.
"S. 55. Express trusts may be created, for any or either of the
following purposes:
I. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors:
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of legatees,
or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon:
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them
to the education and support, or either,578 of any person, during
the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules
prescribed in the first Article of this Title:
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to accumu577 Id. at 585.
578 Emphasis supplied.
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late the same, for the purposes and within the limits prescribed
in the first Article of this Title.579
"57. Where a trust is created to receive the rents and profits
of lands, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the
surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum that may be
necessary for the education and support of the person for whose
benefit the trust is created, shall be liable, in equity, to the claims
of the creditors of such person, in the same manner as other personal property, which cannot be reached by an execution at law.
"60. Every express trust, valid, as such, in its creation, except as herein otherwise provided, shall vest the whole estate in
the trustees, in law and in equity, subject only to the execution
of the trust. The persons for whose benefit the trust is created,
shall take no estate or interest in the lands, but may enforce performance of the trust in equity.
"63. No person beneficially interested in a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands, can assign or in any manner
dispose of such interest; but the rights and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust for the payment of a sum in gross is
created, are assignable.
"64. Where an express trust is created, but is not contained
or declared in the conveyance to the trustees, such conveyance
shall be deemed absolute, as against the subsequent creditors of
the trustees, not having notice of the trust, and as against purchasers from such trustees, without notice, and for a valuable
consideration.
"65. Where the trust shall be expressed in the instrument
creating the estate, every sale, conveyance or other act of the trustees, in contravention of the trust shall be absolutely void.
"68. Upon the death of the surviving trustee of an express
trust, the trust estate shall not descend to his heirs, nor pass to his
personal representatives; but the trust, if then unexecuted, shall
vest in the court of chancery, with all the powers and duties of
the original trustee, and shall be executed by some person appointed for that purpose, under the direction of the court."580

In 1830, upon advice of the revisers, subsection 3 of section 55
1179 Part Il, c. 1, tit. Il, art. First, §37, limits accumulations to those for the benefit
of minors during minority.
GSO Part n, c. 1, tit. n, art. Second, §§45, 47, 55, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68.
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was amended by striking out the words "education and support, or
either," and substituting the word "use."581
During the years 1844 through 1846, a revision of the statutes
of Michigan was prepared by a single commissioner, Judge Sanford
M. Green, a former New York lawyer.582 Judge Green's draft contained a chapter on uses and trusts which incorporated, without change
in substance, the provisions of the New York statutes quoted above, as
they had been amended in 1830. This was enacted, with two changes,
as Chapter 63 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846, which became effective March 1, 1847 and is still in force. 583 The two changes
made by the legislature were in the section listing permissible trusts
(sec. 55, New York; sec. 11, Michigan). 584 Subsection 4 was amended
to permit accumulations for married women, not limited to minority,
and a new subsection 5 was added. The section, as enacted and in
force in Michigan reads,
"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or either of
the following purposes:
I. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors:
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of legatees,
or for the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon:
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and apply them
to the use of any person, during the life of such person, or for any
shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in the last preceding
chapter:
5813 R.S.N.Y., 579 (ed. 1836). As to this, the revisers said, "The word 'use' includes
education and support, and each of them. It will also include other purposes, which ought
to be provided for." Ibid. As to the effect of the amendment, see GmswoLD, SPENDTBRIFT
TaoSTs, 2d ed., §§65, 66 (1947).
582Rev. Stat. 1846, p. III; Weadock, ''The Public Services of Sanford M. Green," 17
MICH. PxoNBER AND HxsT. CoLLEcnoNs, 2d ed., 357-369 (1910); Howell N.P. 308; 117
Mich. xlvi. Green practiced at Brownsville, New York, 1833-1835, and married the
daughter of a New York judge. He moved to Owosso, Michigan, in 1837 and became a
state senator. He was a judge of the Michigan Supreme Court, 1848-1857, circuit judge
at Pontiac, 1857-1867, and circuit judge at Bay City, 1872-1887.
583 Comp. Laws (1857) §§2631 to 2657; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4114 to 4140; Comp.
Laws (1897) §§8829 to 8855; How. Stat., §§5563 to 5589; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11565
to 11591; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12967 to 12993; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.51 to 26.77;
Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.1 to 555.27. Sections 1, 3, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, and 24,
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, correspond, respectively to §§45, 47, 55, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, and
68, R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §2, copied
from R.S.N.Y. 1829, "part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §46, provides, "Every estate which
is now held as an use, executed under the laws of this state as they formerly existed, is
confirmed as a legal estate." As the Statute of Uses was in force in New York prior to the
revision of 1829, this section had extensive application there. It having been held in
Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 (1861) that the Statute of Uses was repealed in Michigan
by the Act of September 16, 1810, note 38 supra, the section's application here is limited
to uses created before 1810.
584 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. V.
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4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to accumulate the same for the benefit of any married woman, or for either
of the purposes and within the limits prescribed in the preceding
chapter: 585
5. For the beneficial interest of any person or persons, when
such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of
the instrument creating it, subject to the limitations as to time prescribed in this title. "586
The addition of subsection 5 wholly altered the nature of the legislation. As has been seen, the New York revisers intended to abolish
all continuing trusts except those for the support and education of
minors, married women and incompetents. Their provisions as to the
nature and inalienability of the interest of the cestui que trust were
inserted with this in mind. The original New York statute did not
carry out this intention perfectly because it failed to define the persons
who could be beneficiaries of a trust for education and support. Probably the revisers did not anticipate the creation of spendthrift trusts
for the benefit of persons who were not incompetent. The New York
amendment of subsection 3, made in 1830, altered the scheme to some
extent by permitting trusts, for the life of any cestui que trust, not limited to education and support. The Michigan addition of subsection 5
changed it wholly by permitting trusts for any purpose whatever, so
long as the cestui que trust is not in possession. Yet the Michigan
statutes retain the provisions which make the interest of the cestui que
trust an inalienable chose in action,587 despite their inappropriateness
to trusts which are not for the education or support of minors, married
women or incompetents.
Both the New York and Michigan statutes abolish trusts of land
under which the cestui que trust is entitled to beneficial possession.588
This eliminates several types of trust which would have been valid in
England after the High Court of Chancery had created the exceptions
585 Emphasis

supplied to show words not in the New York subsection. The reference

to the "preceding chapter" is to Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §37; Comp. Laws (1857) §2621;

Comp. Laws (1871) §4104; Comp. Laws (1897) §8819; How. Stat., §5553; Comp. Laws
(1915) §11555; Comp. Laws (1929) §12957; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.37; Comp. Laws
(1948) §554.37, which was the same as N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art.
First, §37, note 579 supra. This section [Comp. Laws (1948) §554.37] was amended by
Act 227, P.A. 1949, and repealed by Act 6, P.A. 1952.
586 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §11, note 583 supra.
5B7R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §§57, 60, 63, note 580 supra;
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 16, 19, note 583 supra.
588 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §47, note 580 supra; Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 63, §3, note 583 supra.
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to the Statute of Uses discussed above.589 These are the trust of an
estate for years, the use on a use, and the trust under which the trustee
has active duties. None of these was executed by the English Statute
of Uses, whether or not the cestui que trust was entitled to possession.
The New York and Michigan statutes execute them, that is, destroy
the estate of the trustee and convert the interest of the cestui que trust
into a legal estate, when the cestui is entitled to possession and the
receipt of the rents and profits.
English law imposes no limit on the duration of trusts. If a conveyance is made to A and his heirs upon trust for B and his heirs, A
holds a legal fee simple and Ban equitable fee simple, both of which
are potentially perpetual. Inasmuch as the estates of both are alienable,
B can terminate the trust at any time by having A convey to him, by
conveying to A, or by joining A in a conveyance to a third party. When
the estates of the trustee and the cestui que trust are inalienable, however, as they are in New York and Michigan in the case of trusts for the
receipt of the rents and profits of lands,590 the trust is indestructible
and some limit on duration is desirable. The language of subsection
3 of the New York and Michigan statutes defining permissible trusts
might have been construed to limit the duration of any trust created
thereunder to the life of a single beneficiary. It has not been so construed in either New York or Michigan. However, the preceding
article of the New York statutes provided,
"S. 15. The absolute power of alienation, shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period than during the continuance of not more than two lives
in being at the creation of the estate, except in the single case
mentioned in the next section."591
Before the Revised Statutes of 1846 were adopted, the New York
courts had held that, because of the inalienability of the interest of the
589 At

notes 543-545.
1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §63, note 580 supra; Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra, quoted in the text at note 621 infra.
591 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. First, §15. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15,
Comp. Laws (1857) §2599; Comp. Laws (1871) §4082; Comp. Laws (1897) §8797;
How. Stat. §5531; Comp. Laws (1915) §11533; Comp. Laws (1929) §12935; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.15; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.15 was identical. The next section originally
provided: "s. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee,
to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited, shall
die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency, by which the estate
of such persons may be determined before they attain their full age." Sections 554.14 to
554.20 of Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) were repealed by P.A. 38 in 1949. See note 594
infra.
590 R.S.N.Y.
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cestui que trust, a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands
suspended the absolute power of alienation, and, therefore, section 15
limited the duration of such trusts to two lives in being.592 Section 15
was adopted here in 1846 and the decisions under it were to the same
effect.598 A Michigan statute of 1949 repealed section 15 and reestablished the common law Rule Against Perpetuities as to interests in land
created by wills becoming effective and deeds executed after September
23, 1949.594 This repeal raises the question of the permissible duration
of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of lands.
Subsection 3 permits only trusts, "to receive the rents and profits
of lands, and apply them to the use of any person, during the life of
such person, or for any shorter term." Although, as has been noted,
this does not limit the duration of trusts, it does limit in quantity the
equitable interest of any one beneficiary to a life interest. This being
so, there can be no such thing as an equitable fee simple under subsection 3. There can be a succession of equitable life interests followed
by a legal remainder in fee but each life interest and the remainder
must vest within the period of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities which is, generally speaking, lives in being and twenty-one years.
Thus the Rule Against Perpetuities, although not itself a rule limiting
the duration of trusts, operates in conjunction with the language of
592 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61
(1836); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT App., c. A, ,rl7 (1944); see PoWELL .AND WHITESIDE,
THE STATUTES oF THE STATE oF NEw Yonx CoNCERNING PERPETUITIES .AND RELATED
MATTERS 63-73 [New York Legislative Document (1936) No. 65(H)].
598 Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Foster v. Stevens, 146
Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917);
Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co.
v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich.
588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270,
255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938).
In most of the cases the problem was complicated by contentions that not only the trust
itself but future interests subject to it or expectant upon it offended section 15. It was
held formerly that section 15 limited the duration of charitable trusts. Methodist Episcopal
Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879); see Scudder v. Security
Trust Co., 238 Mich. 318, 213 N.W. 131 (1927). This effect of the section was eliminated by Act 122, P.A. 1907, superseded by Act 280, P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915)
§11099; Comp. Laws (1929) §13512; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.1191; Comp Laws (1948)
§554.351, and supplemented by Act 373, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) §13517; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §26.1201; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.381. Discussion of the exceptions to the
applicability of §15 to trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of land and of the
computation of the permissible period, as to which New York and Michigan law are not
entirely in harmony, is beyond the scope of the present study. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT
App., c. B, ,r56 (1944).
1594 Act 38, P.A. 1949, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.49(1), 26.49(2), 26.49(3); Comp.
Laws (1948) §§554.51, 554.52, 554.53. See Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W.
(2d) 834 (1950).

524

MmmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

subsection 3 to impose what amounts to a limitation on the duration
of trusts created under that subsection.
Subsection 5, which is peculiar to Michigan, permits trusts for
"the beneficial interest of any person or persons . . . subject to the
limitations as to time prescribed in this title." The reference was to
section 15, now repealed, so it would seem that there is now no limitation on the duration of trusts created under this subsection, that is,
the interest of the cestui que trust may be an equitable fee simple.
As the interest of the cestui que trust under a trust for the receipt of
the rents and profits of lands is inalienable, it becomes material to
inquire whether it is permissible to create a trust for the receipt of the
rents and profits of lands under subsection 5. If so, it may now be
possible to set up a perpetual trust of land under which the interests
of the cestui que trust, although in fee simple, will always be inalienable, except to the extent that the statutes permit his creditors to reach
the surplus of income beyond that necessary for his education and support.595 Such a trust would have the undesirable characteristics of
the perpetually unbarrable entail, which the English courts abolished
in 1472. 596
·
Two types of trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of land
may possibly be sustainable under subsection 5. Subsection 3 permits
only trusts to "apply" the rents and profits of land to the use of any
person. It could be argued that when the trust is to receive the rents
and profits and pay them over to the cestui que trust, the trust falls
under subsection 5 rather than subsection 3. The New York courts
have decided that a trust to receive the rents and profits and pay them
over to the beneficiary falls under subsection 3,597 but these decisions
might not be followed in Michigan because they were rendered after
1846 and because, as New York has no subsection 5, the only alternative there to sustaining such trusts under subsection 3 would be to
hold them void. Subsection 3 permits trusts to apply the rents and
profits of lands to the use of any person only, "during the life of such
595Rev. Stat. (1846) c. 63, §§13, 19, note 583 supra. These sections correspond to
sections 57 and 63 of the New York statute, quoted in the text at note 580 supra. The
Restatement of Trusts takes the position that a trust may not be made indestructible
beyond the period of the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. Section 62, comment
k (1935). Professor Scott agrees with this position but cites no authority for it. LAW oF
TnosTs §62.10 (1939). As England has not made trusts indestructible by statute and
does not permit them to be made indestructible by restraints on alienation, the· question
cannot arise there.
596 Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), note 67 supra.
597Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297 (1849); Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N.Y. 516 (1894);
PRoPERTY R:sSTATEMENT App., c. A, ,i18 (1944).
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person, or for any shorter term." It could be argued that, if the trust
is to apply the rents and profits to the use of B and his heirs, it cannot be sustained under subsection 3 but can be under subsection 5.
To maintain this argument it is necessary to assert that subsection 3
does not prohibit the creation of any trust to apply the rents and profits
of land to the use of beneficiaries so long as it is not created under
that subsection. In view of the undesirability of permitting perpetual
trusts under which the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable, the
Michigan Supreme Court may hold that subsections 3 and 4 are the
only authority for the creation of trusts for the receipt of the rents and
profits of lands. If so, the menace of perpetually inalienable equitable
estates in fee simple will be averted.
As to alienation by the trustee, the New York and Michigan
statutes introduce three changes in the English law. First, when the
trust is not contained or declared in the conveyance to the trustees,
subsequent creditors of the trustee without notice of the trust may levy
on the trust property free of the trust.598 The English rule was otherwise.599 Second, the legal estate of the trustee is not devisable and
does not pass to the trustee's heir upon intestacy. 600 As to this, also,
the English rule was otherwise.601 Third, when the trust is contained
or declared in the conveyance to the trustee, a transfer by the trustee
in breach of trust is absolutely void.602 In England such a transfer
effectively conveyed the legal title to the transferee, who took it subject
to the trust.603
This provision that the trustee's transfer in breach of trust is a complete nullity, even when the cestui que trust requests a transfer, can
cause seriously undesirable situations where the trust property is salable
but is deteriorating, requires repairs which the trustee cannot finance,
or will produce no income without improvements which the trustee
cannot finance or is not empowered to make. Under the English law,
a conveyance by the trustee would carry the legal title and the con598 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §64, note 580 supra; Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 63, §20, note 583 supra.
599 Note 550 supra.
600 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §68, note 580 supra; Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 63, §24, note 583 supra.
601 Note 55Q supra.
602 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §65, note 580 supra; Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 63, §21, note 583 supra.
603 Note 551 supra. There can be no problem of a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice of the trust in this situation because the declaration of trust in the trustee's
chain of title is notice to purchasers from him.
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currence of the cestui que trust would bar his interest.605 A statute
enacted in 1887 was designed to ameliorate the situation by empowering the circuit court in chancery to authorize testamentary trustees
without power of sale to sell the trust property free of trust and hold
the proceeds in trust. 606 The 1887 act provides, however, that,
"No sale or conveyance of any kind shall be made of any
property contrary to any specific provision in regard thereto contained in the deed of conveyance, or in the will under which the
petitioner holds the said property."607
Young v. Y oung608 was a suit by trustees for permission to sell land
in fee. The land was devised to the plaintiffs in trust to pay the rents
and profits to named persons for ten years, if either of two children
of the testator should so long live, legal remainder to the two children
for their lives, legal remainder in fee to their issue or the issue of the
survivor of them. The will expressly denied the trustees power to sell
and directed them to hold the property intact during the term of the
trust. It also provided that the children should not have power to sell
or mortgage during their lives. Before the ten years expired a hotel
building on the land burned and the trustees could not finance construction of any building which would produce income or pay the
taxes without income. A decree directing sale and the substitution
of the proceeds for the original trust property was affirmed after the
expiration of the ten years. The court held that courts of equity have
inherent power, independent of statute, to permit deviation from terms
of trusts restricting alienation and that the quoted section of the 1887
act did not restrict this non-statutory power. The opinion does not
refer to the section of the Revised Statutes which makes "absolutely
605-See note 566 supra.
606 Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) §§9234 to 9242. Reenacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws (1915) §§12716 to
12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§27.1188 to 27.1196;
Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 619.70; note 283 supra. Cf. Act 258, P.A. 1925, Comp.
Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann §§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws
- (1948) §§554.401 to 554.404, relating to charitable dispositions, note 224 supra.
607 Act 233, P.A. 1887, §9; Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §70; Comp. Laws (1915)
§12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §14412; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948)
§619.70. The term "deed of conveyance" is explicable by the fact that the statute permits
legal life tenants holding under deed or will to petition for sale of the fee, although it
applies only to trustees under wills.
608 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931). See Garrison v. Hecker, 128 Mich. 539,
87 N.W. 642 (1901); Hall v. Williamson, 304 Mich. 657, 8 N.W. (2d) 869 (1943).
Cf. Trustees of the M.J. Clark Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378
(1927).
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void" every sale or conveyance by trustees in contravention of the
trust609 and does not discuss the validity of the provisions of the will
imposing a prohibition on alienation of the legal life estate of the children. The result reached in Young 17. Young is dearly desirable and
in harmony with the general Anglo-American law of trusts. 610 Nevertheless, it Hatly contravenes the Michigan statutes. The decision
amounts to a partial judicial repeal of the arbitrary and virtually unworkable system set up by the New York revisers and a return to the
principles of the English law of trusts, which those revisers sought to
abolish.
Bennett 17. Chapin611 was a suit to construe a will. The testatrix
devised two lots and other property to her executors upon trust to provide for the education and support of her daughter during minority,
then to pay her a thousand dollars a year until she reached the
age of thirty-five, when the property was to be transferred to her. If
the daughter died before reaching thirty-five, her issue were to succeed to her rights and, if she was not survived by issue, the property
was to be conveyed to testatrix's husband. The will provided that the
lots should not be sold for less than $16,500. After the death of the
testatrix's husband, the daughter, aged thirty-one and without issue,
sued for a determination that she had power to terminate the trust and
sell the two lots for $10,000. A decree dismissing her bill was reversed. The court held that the daughter had an indefeasibly vested
estate in fee simple and that the restraint on alienation was void, citing
Mandlehaum 17. McDonell612 and a passage in Gray's Rule Against
Perpetuities stating the English rule that when property is given to
trustees to transfer to a beneficiary upon his reaching a certain age and
there is no one else beneficially interested, the beneficiary may compel
the trustees to convey to him before he reaches the specified age,
despite the fact that termination will defeat a material purpose of the
609 Rev.

Stat. 1846, c. 63, §21, note 583 supra, adopting R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1,

art. Second, §65, note 580 supra. The New York statute has been amended to permit the

result reached in Young v. Young. N.Y. Real Property Law §105.
6l0TnosTs R:llSTATI!MENT §167 (1935); Scon, LAw OF TnosTs §167 (1939).
611 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). The case is not followed when there are
non-consenting contingent beneficiaries. Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 76.1
(1910); In re Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). In Blossom
v. Anketell, (D.C. Mich. 1921) 275 F. 947, the sole beneficiary was not allowed to
terminate a trust, the terms of which did not entitle him to the principal during his lifetime unless the trustees, in their discretion, chose to convey it to him. The decision seems
inconsistent, in principle, with Bennett v. Chapin.
612 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra.
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trust.613 The opinion does not mention the Michigan statutes relative
to trusts of land. That the decision is in conflict with those statutes
is abundantly clear from the New York decisions on the point.614 It
is also in conflict with the rule generally followed in this country in the
absence of statute.615 In this case, as in Young v. Young, the result
reached is desirable and in harmony with the English law of trusts.
Fredericks v. Near616 was an action of assumpsit. The defendants
conveyed land owned by them by the entirety to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff and defendants entered into a substantially contemporaneous
agreement providing that the plaintiff held as trustee for the purpose
of selling the land and paying a debt owed by the defendant husband
and that the defendants jointly and severally agreed to pay any deficiency. Being unable to effect a sale, the plaintiff, with the consent
of the creditor, reconveyed the land to the defendants. The defendant
husband was later discharged in bankruptcy. The plaintiff sought to
hold the defendant wife liable personally on the assumption of liability
in the trust agreement. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed,
the court saying,
'We recognize the rule that a trustee, without the consent or
acquiescence of the beneficiary, cannot surrender the trust estate,
but, in the case at bar, the trustee, the cestui que trust, and settlors
were all sui juris, and could, by mutual consent, terminate the
trust and restore the status quo."617

This language appears to be a statement of the rule, which is well
settled in England and in states where it has not been altered by statute,
that the settlor and cestui que trust may always terminate a trust, even
though termination will defeat a material purpose of the trust, provided
the cestui que trust is fully competent and there are no other beneficiaries affected.618 In New York this rule is not applicable to trusts
for receipt of the rents and profits of land created under subsections 3
and 4 because the statutes make the interests of both trustee and cestui
613 The passage quoted by the court is in §120, 3d ed. (1915). It collects the
English cases and follows the English view that all prohibitions on alienation, on legal
or equitable interests, are void, except on the separate equitable estate of a married woman.
614See Matter of Wentworth, 230 N.Y. 176, 129 N.E. 646 (1920) and other cases
cited in GRISWOLD, SPEND'l'HRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., 526 (1947).
615 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §337, comments j, k (1935); 3 Scon, LAw oF TRUSTS
§337.3 (1939); GRISWOLD, SPI!NDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §513 (1947). This is known
as the Rule in Clallin v. Claflin [149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889)].
616 260 Mich. 627, 245 N.W. 537 (1932).
617 Id. at 631.
618 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §338 (1935); Scon, LAw oF TRUSTS §338 (1939). In
England the consent of the settlor is not required.
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que trust inalienable. 619 It would seem that the New York rule should
apply in Michigan to trusts created under subsections 3, 4 and 5 and
that, if the opinion in Fredericks 11. Near holds otherwise, it is wrong.
The trust involved in the case was, however, created under subsection
1 of the statute and the right of the beneficiary was to receive a sum
in gross. Consequently the interest of the beneficiary was alienable
by the express provision of the statute and the decision is sound on its
facts.020
The statutory prohibition on voluntary alienation of the cestui's
interest under a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of land
has no express exceptions. It reads, "No person beneficially interested
in a trust for the receipt of the. rents and profits of lands, can assign
or in any manner dispose of such interest."621 The decision in Bennett
11. Chapin622 makes an exception to the statute, permitting a cestui que
trust, who is entitled to a conveyance of the trust property in fee upon
reaching a stipulated age, to terminate prematurely a trust for the
receipt of the rents and profits of lands. The New York courts hold
that the statutory prohibition on voluntary alienation does not apply
to the interest of a cestui que trust who was the settlor of the trust.623
The Michigan Supreme Court has given some indication that it may
not follow this view.624 Apart from these two situations, there appears
to be no exception to the statutory rule that the cestui of a trust for
the receipt of the rents and profits of land cannot voluntarily alienate
his interest.625
With regard to involuntary alienation, chapter 63 of the Revised
Statutes of 1846 provides,
"Sec. 13. When a trust is created to receive the rents and
profits of lands, and no valid direction for accumulation is given,
the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond the sum that may
be necessary for the education and support of the person for whose

619 Note 614 supra.
620Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra, corresponding to R.S.N.Y. 1829, part
II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §63, quoted at note 580 supra.
621 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra.
622 Note 611 supra.
623 Newton v. Hunt, 134 App. Div. 325, 119 N.Y.S. 3 (1909), affd. 201 N.Y. 599,
95 N.E. 1134 (1909); see Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898).
624 See Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106 at 116, 113 N.W. 787 (1907).
625 See Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 380, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Ward v. Ward,
163 Mich. 570 at 575, 128 N.W. 761 (1910); In re Allen's Estate, 240 Mich. 661 at
664-665, 216 N.W. 446 (1927) (implying that the cestui's interest is not transmissible
by will). But see Alberts v. Steiner, 237 Mich. 143, 211 N.W. 46 (1926), where the
cestui que trust did not contest the validity of her mortgage and the mortgagee was allowed
to reach the rents and profits. The opinion does not refer to the statute.
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benefit the trust is created, shall be liable in equity, to the claims
of creditors of such person, in the same manner as other personal
property which cannot be reached by an execution at law."626
As was to be expected, this provision was interpreted to mean
that creditors cannot reach the rents and profits to the extent that they
are necessary for the education and support of the cestui que trust. 627
The right of creditors to reach the surplus was complicated by contradictory provisions of chapter 90 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 which
permitted judgment creditors of a cestui que trust to reach his interest
under the trust, "except where such trust has been created by, or the
fund so held in trust has proceeded from, some person other than the
defendant."628 If the provisions of chapters 63 and 90 are read literally
it would appear that the interest of a cestui que trust under a trust for
the receipt of the rents and profits of land could not be reached by his
creditors at all if he was not the settlor of the trust and could be reached
only as to the surplus income above his needs for education and support
if he was the settlor.629 Such is not the present judicial interpretation.
The courts hold that, if the cestui que trust was the settlor, chapter 63
has no application and chapter 90 has full application, so that the
entire income, not merely the surplus above what is necessary for
support and education, may be reached by creditors.630 If the cestui que
trust was not the settlor, chapter 90 has no application and chapter 63
applies, so that the surplus of rents and profits beyond what is necessary
for the support and education of the cestui is accessible in equity by
his creditors.631 Of course, in no case may his interest be reached by
attachment at law.632
Note 583 supra.
Cummings v. Corey, 58 Mich. 494, 25 N.W. 481 (1885). In this case the life
beneficiary, whose interest was in question, was also the trustee. The trust was created
by the will of another.
628 Emphasis supplied. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 90, §§24, 25. Repealed, Act 184, P.A.
1851. Reenacted, Act 120, P.A. 1855; Comp. Laws (1857) §§3478, 3479; Comp. Laws
(1871) §§5060, 5061; How. Stat. §§6614, 6615; Comp. Laws (1897) §§436, 437. Reenacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 6, §4(6); Comp. Laws (1915) §12302; Comp. Laws
(1929) §13944; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.545(b); Comp. Laws (1948) §606.4(6). These
sections correspond to R.S.N.Y. 1829, part III, c. 1, tit. 2, art. Second, §§38, 39.
629 This was the result reached by the earlier New York cases. They are collected in
GmswoLD, S:eENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §70n (1947).
aso Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162
Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 715 (1910).
631 Spring v. Randall, 107 Mich. 103, 64 N.W. 1063 (1895). But in Gilkey v.
Gilkey, note 630 supra, it was held that no part of the interest of the beneficiary under a
trust for support from the rents and profits of land created by another could be reached to
satisfy a decree for alimony. The court made no mention of either statute, saying merely
that payment of alimony was not within the uses to which the trustee was authorized to
626

627
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The New York statute "Of Uses and Trusts" is Article Second
of Title II of Chapter I of Part II of the Revised Statutes of 1829.
Title II is entitled, "Of the Nature and Qualities of Estates in Real
Property, and the Alienation Thereof." Chapter I is entitled, "Of Real
Property, and of the Nature, Qualities and Alienation of Estates
Therein." This gives the impression that the statute was intended
to govern only trusts of freehold estates in land. Nevertheless Article
First of Title II contains several provisions relative to estates for years,
which it declares shall be chattels real,633 and the revisers' notes make
it clear that they intended the section abolishing trusts which entitled
the cestui que trust to possession634 to apply to trusts of estates for
years.635 There seems never to have been any doubt that the section
limiting the purposes for which trusts might be created did not apply to
trusts of other types of personal property and New York decisions
rendered as late as 1862 held that the sections making the interest
of the cestui que trust inalienable did not apply to such trusts. 636
Nevertheless, on the basis of New York statutes governing personal
property it was settled in 1865 that the interest of the cestui of a trust
for the receipt of income from personal property was subject to the
same inalienability as that of the cestui of a trust for the receipt of the
rents and profits of land.637
The Michigan statute "Of Uses and Trusts" is part of Title XIV
of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which bears the same title as Chapter
I of Part II of the New York Revised Statutes of 1829. Michigan never
apply the income. See notes 570, 573 supra as to the treatment of trusts for support m
states where the law has not been altered by statute. See Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92,
89 N.W. 712 (1902).
632Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 (1861); Allen v. Merrill, Lynch & Co., 223 Mich.
467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923). Neither may it be reached by execution at law, id.; Gorham
v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247 (1871), or by garnishment, Peninsular Savings Bank v. Union
Trust Co., 127 Mich. 355, 86 N.W. 798 (1901). This rule is simply that, the interest
of a cestui que trust being purely equitable, it is accessible to creditors only in equity. In
Feldman v. Preston, 194 Mich. 352, 160 N.W. 655 (1916), it was misunderstood and
distorted into the proposition that property subject to a trust can be reached only in equity.
In that case a trustee with power of sale contracted to sell. The trustee having breached
the contract, the vendee sued him at law and attached the trust property. It was held that
only the trustee's individually owned property, not the trust property, was accessible to
process at law m such an action.
6 83 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. First, §5. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §5, is
the same.
634 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §47. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §3,
is the same.
635 3 R.S.N.Y. 584 (ed. 1836).
636 The cases are collected in GmswoLD, SPEND'l'BlUP'r TnuSTS, 2d ed., §69 (1947).
637 Graff v. Bonnett, 31 N.Y. 9 (1865).
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adopted the New York personal property statutes. Consequently the
Michigan statute "Of Uses and Trusts," chapter 63 of the Revised
Statutes of 1846, has no application to trusts of personal property, other
than chattels real, and they are governed by the English rules of equity,
as modified by judicial decision.638 Moreover, when the trust instrument directs the trustee to convert land into personalty, the doctrine
of equitable conversion applies and the trust is treated as one of personal property, unaffected by the provisions of chapters 62 and 63 of
the Revised Statutes of 1846.639
If, then, a trust is of personal property, other than chattels real,
or is treated as such, the normal Anglo-American rules of equity
apply to transfers of the legal title by the trustee and the interest of the
cestui que trust is freely alienable and accessible to his creditors unless
the terms of the trust itself validly restrain alienation.640 As has been
seen, the "spendthrift trust" doctrine accepted in most American states
permits the imposition of a prohibitory restraint on alienation when
the only rights of the cestui que trust are to receive the income from the
trust property during his life or some shorter period.641 When the
cestui que trust also has rights in the principal, there is less harmony
as to the validity of such a prohibitory restraint, especially when it
638Ledyard's Appeal, 51 Mich. 623, 17 N.W. 208 (1883); Hopkins v. Crossley, 132
Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Moore v. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661
(1914).
639 Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42,
44 N.W. 1057 (1890) (direction to convert Michigan land into Missouri land exempted
trust from the statutes); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976
(1924); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Floyd
v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 626,
289 N.W. 275 (1939). These cases involved the question of whether Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 62, §15, note 591 supra, applied to the trusts involved, but the same result should be
reached as to the application of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, note 583 supra. It was
held in Thatcher v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37
Mich. 264 (1877), that if the terms of a trust give the trustee power of sale, a trust does
not offend Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15, regardless of duration. It does not follow that such
a trust would cease to be one for receipt of the rents and profits of land and so free from
the prohibition on alienation of the cestui que trust's interest imposed by Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 63, §§13, 19, until the land is actually sold. The decision in the Thatcher case was
questioned in Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), and later overruled by a decision that a power of sale for reinvestment does not exempt a trust of land
from the provisions of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15. Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85
N.W. 1100 (1901). Of course, if a trust of land is valid and the trustee actually does
sell the land and reinvest in personalty under a power conferred on him by the terms of
the trust, the trust ceases to be one for receipt of the rents and profits of land and the
statutory prohibition on alienation of the beneficiary's interest imposed by Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 63, §§ 13, 19, ceases to operate.
640 Alienability of cestui's interest: Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712
(1902).
641 Note 569 supra.
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purports to restrain alienation of the interest in the principal as well
as the right to the income.642

Hackley

11.

Rose

Southern Michigan National Bank647 was a proceeding

Littell648 was a proceeding in equity, brought by the
trustee, to set aside assignments of her interest made by a cestui que
trust. In 1887 Mrs. Littell transferred $50,000 to a trustee, to pay the
income to her during her lifetime and transfer the principal to others
upon her death. The trust instrument provided that Mrs. Littell could
not anticipate, transfer, or assign any part of the income or principal.
In 1901 the trustee sued Mrs. Littell in equity and in 1902 a decree
was entered declaring that the trust was a valid spendthrift trust which
Mrs. Littell had no right to terminate and under which she was entitled only to the income. In 1905 Mrs. Littell made several security
assignments of her interest under the trust and the assignees claimed
the income. A decree determining that the assignments were "void
and of no effect," and directing the trustee to continue paying the
income directly to Mrs. Littell, was affirmed on the ground the 1902
decree was res judicata of the spendthrift character of the trust. All
of the justices seemed to assume the validity of spendthrift trusts. One
justice dissented on the ground that spendthrift provisions are ineffective as to the interest of a cestui que trust who is also the settlor; that is,
that a person may not set up a spendthrift trust for himself.644 The
majority of the court agreed that, in view of the provisions of chapter
90 of the Revised Statutes of 1846,645 "one may not declare a trust
in his own property, reserving a beneficial interest in himself, which
interest shall not be subject to proceedings by a judgment creditor"646
but questioned whether the settlor of a trust may not bar his own voluntary alienation of his interest under it. The form of the litigation
suggests a factor in the spendthrift trust problem which is seldom
emphasized, that spendthrift provisions are often inserted in trust
instruments not so much to protect the cestui que trust against his own
folly as to protect the trustee against the trouble of dealing with the
claims of creditors and assignees.
11.

642 Notes 571, 572 supra.
648 150 Mich. 106, 113 N.W. 787 (1907).
644 See note 574 supra.
645 Note 628 supra.
646 150 Mich. 116, 113 N.W. 791.
647255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931). Accord: Hay v. LeBus, 317 Mich. 698,
27 N.W. (2d) 309 (1947). It is not made certain in the opinion or the record in the
Rose case that there was no land involved but the will contained a direction to convert
land to personalty. The Hay case involved a trust of both land and personalty.
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for approval of a compromise brought under a statute permitting the
competent living persons whose interests will be affected to compromise any good faith contest of the admission of a will to probate,
or any good faith controversy as to the construction of a will, subject
to approval of the probate or circuit court. 648 The statute provided
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent unborn and
unascertained persons with contingent interests. The will involved,
which was contested on the ground of mental incapacity of the testator,
bequeathed personal property to a trustee to pay the income to the
testator's son during his lifetime and, upon his death, to transfer the
property to the then living lawful heirs of the testator. The will directed
that the son's interest should not be liable for his debts. The compromise
agreement provided that the property covered by the trust should be
turned over to the son, free of trust. The !rnstee and the guardian
ad litem for future contingent interests appealed from a decree approving the compromise. The decree was reversed on the grounds that the
trust set up by the will was a spendthrift trust under which the beneficiary's interest was inalienable by virtue of section 19 of chapter 63,
Revised Statutes of 1846 and that a court of equity has no power to
terminate a spendthrift trust prematurely. The opinion overlooks the
facts that the will imposed no restraint on voluntary alienation by the
son and that chapter 63 has no application to trusts of personal property. It also fails to distinguish between an attempt to terminate prematurely a valid trust and a compromise agreement made under the
statute where there is real question as to whether the will creating the
trust is valid. If the decision had been based on the unfairness of the
agreement to the unascertained contingent remaindermen, no quarrel
could be found with it. It would also be justified if based on a finding
that the will contest was not in good faith but a mere subterfuge for
getting rid of the spendthrift trust. 649 The opinion as written seems
648 Act 249, P.A. 1921, Comp. Laws 1929, §§15581 to 15584; reenacted, Act 288,
P.A. 1939, c. 2, §§45 to 48; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (115-118); Comp. Laws (1948)
§§702.45 to 702.48. Sec. 47 provides, in part, "such court shall, if such contest or controversy shall appear to be in good faith and if the effects of such agreement upon the estates
and interests of the persons and interests so represented by any fiduciary or guardian ad
litem and upon any inalienable estate or interest shall be found to be just and reasonable,
make an order approving such agreement. • • ." Emphasis supplied. The underlined
words were in the statute when the compromise involved in the Rose case was entered
into. Compromise agreements modifying trusts without spendthrift provisions have been
approved, even when the modification involved acceleration of payments to beneficiaries.
Metzner v. Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923); Detroit Trust Co. v.
Neubauer, 325 Mich. 319, 38 N.W. (2d) 371 (1949).
649 See GmswoLD, S.eENDTHRIPT TnusTs, 2d ed., §522 (1947).
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unsound and leaves the law on the points involved in an unhappily
confused state.

In re Ford's Estate650 was a proceeding under the statute involved
in the Rose case for approval of a compromise agreement as to the
construction of a will. The will provided that, on the death of the
testator's widow, certain assets should be used to create two trusts, one
for the benefit of each of the testator's sons and the issue of such son.
It authorized the trustees, in their discretion, to pay $100 a month
from income to each son and directed them to pay a third of the corpus
of his trust to each son on reaching 30, a third on reaching 35, and
the balance on reaching 40. Other paragraphs provided,
"Should either or both of my sons at any time or times develop
spendthrift or disorderly habits, my trustees are authorized and
empowered to withhold from such son any part of the income and
any part of the distributable corpus provided herein directed to
be paid to any beneficiary.
"The trustees shall not be permitted nor authorized to recognize any assignment of interest or principal herein directed to be
paid to any beneficiary."
The testator died in 1942, when his son Milton was 29 and his
son Melvin was 27. Milton died in 1944, after his thirtieth birthday.
After Melvin reached 35, he, Milton's administratrix, guardians for
the living children of the two sons, and the widow of the testator,
entered into the compromise agreement, providing for immediate distribution of the entire corpus of Milton's trust, one third to his estate
and two thirds to his child, immediate distribution of two thirds of
the corpus of Melvin's trust to him, the payment of the full income
of the balance of Melvin's trust to him, and the distribution of the
remaining corpus to him on reaching 40. A guardian ad litem for
interested persons not in being appealed from a judgment approving
the compromise on the grounds that the will did not authorize any
distribution prior to the death of the testator's widow and that immediate distribution would constitute premature termination of spendthrift
trusts. The judgment was affirmed on the ground that the trusts were
not spendthrift trusts because of the cestuis' interest in principal. The
decision appears to stand for the proposition that, if the cestui has an
interest in the principal, spendthrift provisions are void, even as to his
interest in income.
650 331 Mich. 220, 49 N.W. (2d) 154 (1951). The trustees had converted the real
property in the estate into personalty before the date 0£ the compromise agreement.
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Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co.6151 was a suit to surcharge trustees
for breach of trust. Catherine A. Peck bequeathed personal property
valued at about $415,000 to the Michigan Trust Company and Percy
S. Peck, upon trust to pay the income to Percy S. Peck during his
lifetime, remainder as he should by will appoint or, in default of
appointment, to his issue. The will provided,
"No person beneficially interested in any legacy or devise
given by this will to my said Trustee or Trustees shall have power
to assign, convey, pledge, hypothecate or anticipate the payment of
any sum or delivery of any property which may at any time be or
become due or payable by way of income or principal, under the
terms of this will; and if any such assignment, conveyance, pledge,
hypothecation or other instrument by way of anticipation is executed, the same shall be void and of no effect, and shall not be
recognized by my Trustee or Trustees, and it or they shall have
power to withhold further payment to such person so beneficially
interested in such legacy or devise, until such assignment, conveyance, pledge, hypothecation or other instrument shall be withdrawn or canceled, in such manner as shall be satisfactory to my
said Trustee or Trustees."
The trustees lent $162,000 of trust funds to Percy S. Peck, taking
as security mortgages on land valued at about twice that amount which
he owned individually. The children of Percy S. Peck brought this
suit in their father's lifetime, contending that the loans to him were
in violation of the spendthrift clause and impaired their interests as
contingent remaindermen. The court held that the transactions in
question did not violate the spendthrift clause, which the court treated
as valid. The case is interesting in that it suggests the validity of a
prohibitory restraint on alienation of a beneficiary's right to receive
income for life, even though the beneficiary has a power of disposition
of the remainder interest in the principal. 652 The particular spendthrift clause is also interesting because it contained a provision for
forfeiture on alienation as well as a general prohibition on alienation.668
651 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W. 744 (1935). The trust consisted exclusively of personalty at the time it was created. The trustees later acquired real estate valued at
$1,579.68, evidently by foreclosure of a mortgage and a land contract.
652 In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948), involved the same
trust. Percy S. Peck was adjudicated a bankrupt in 1935 and his interest under the trust
assigned to the plaintiff by his trustee in bankruptcy. The court held no interest under the
trust, in income or principal, passed to the trustee in bankruptcy.
653 For an example of a discretionary trust, of the type which is used in England to
serve the purpose of spendthrift trusts, because they are invalid there, see Boyer v. Backus,
282 Mich. 593, 276 N.W. 564 (1937).
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Wyrzykowski 17. Budds054 was a garnishment proceeding against
a city to reach instalments of pension due the principal defendant,
a retired city policeman. The pension fund, comprising employer and
employee contributions, was established by the city charter, which provided that pensioners could not assign their rights and that pension
payments due should not be subject to legal process for the debts of the
pensioner. The writ was served after a check had been drawn in favor
of the principal defendant but before it had been delivered to him.
A judgment quashing the writ was affirmed. The court thought that
the pension payments were gifts rather than income payable under
a trust but it sustained the validity of the charter provisions by analogy
to like provisions of spendthrift trusts.
It is apparent from the cases that Michigan sustains the validity of
spendthrift trusts of personal property. The precise limits of the spendthrift trust doctrine in this state have not yet been set. Whether as a
matter of policy spendthrift trusts should be allowed, that is, whether
prohibitions on alienation of equitable interests in property should be
enforced, is gravely doubtful. As Dean Griswold has pointed out, the
whole spendthrift trust doctrine in this country has probably grown
up as a result of misunderstanding and confusion.655 Professor John
Chipman Gray's classic work on Restraints on Alienation656 is an eloquent attack on the whole doctrine, based on history, logic and policy.
No satisfactory answer to the arguments against spendthrift trusts
advanced in the Preface to the Second Edition of that work has been
made. Even if spendthrift trusts are to be allowed, there is no adequate
reason for the distinctions which exist in this state between trusts of
land and trusts of personal property. Some arguments can be made
in favor of permitting the settlor of a trust to impose prohibitory
restraints on the alienation of the interest of the cestui que trust. None
can be advanced in favor of the Michigan statutes which make the
interest of the beneficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits
of land inalienable even though the settlor wishes it to be alienable.
Those statutes have caused much confusion. Their application to
trusts which involve both land and personal property raises serious
questions. Regardless of the desirability of spendthrift trusts, those
statutes should be repealed.
654 324 Mich. 731, 37 N.W. (2d) 686 (1949); accord: Wyrzykowski v. City of
Hamtramck, 324 Mich. 738, 37 N.W. (2d) 689 (1949).
655 SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, 2d ed. §§25-32 (1947).
656 (1st ed. 1885); (2d ed. 1895). See note 255 supra.
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As has been seen, although a condition subsequent in general
restraint of alienation in a conveyance of legal title in fee simple to a
private person is always void,657 such a condition in a conveyance of
legal title in fee simple to a charitable or public corporation is valid.658
The same problem can arise as to a conveyance to the trustee of a charitable trust. Michigan refused to enforce charitable trusts until they
were authorized by statute in 1907.659 A statute enacted in 1925 provides that when land is conveyed to a charitable use, subject to such
a condition, and it becomes impossible or impracticable to use the land
in the manner specified, the circuit court may authorize sale of the
land free of the condition of forfeiture. 660 It would seem that such
conditions in general restraint of alienation are still valid, however, and·
will entitle the gi:antor to assert a forfeiture upon alienation other than
pursuant to the statute.
B.

The Mortgage and the Executory Land Contract

The Mediaeval Church did not permit Christians to charge interest
on a loan of money661 or on the unpaid balance of the purchase price
due under a sale on credit. 662 The Law of Moses prohibited Jews
charging interest on loans to Jews663 but not on loans to Gentiles.664
As the Jews in England were liquidated or exiled under Edward I and
657 Notes

108, 109 supra; Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138

supra.
658 Note 222 supra; County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801
(1928), note 223 supra; Trustees of the M. J. Clark Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich.
250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927).
_
659 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207
(1879); Wheelock v. American Trust Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896);
Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155
Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908); McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, 118 N.W. 985
(1909); Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910); Act 122, P.A.
1907, note 593 supra.
660 Act 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to 554.404, quoted in the text at
note 224 supra.
661 O'BRillN, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNOI\:IIC TEACHING 166-193 (1920). The
rule was based on Aristotle's theory of the sterility of money and upon Lmrn, 7:34, 35
(Authorized Version 1611).
662 O'BruEN, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 119 (1920). Similarly,
it was sinful to charge a larger price in a credit sale than in a cash sale. Id. at 119, 187-189.
663Exonus, 22:25; LEvrncus, 25:36, 37; DEOTERONOMY, 23:19 (Authorized Version
1611).
664DmiTERONOMY, 23:19 (Authorized Version 1611).
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Jews were not permitted in the country from then until the seventeenth
century, their exemption from the ban was not a factor in the developmen of the later mediaeval law. Throughout the Middle Ages English
law reinforced the prohibition of canon law.6615 Consequently, one
in need could borrow money commercially only by means of a subterfuge. The needy landowner could make an outright sale of an estate
for years; the needy merchant could sell a share in his business. The
doctrine of just price would, of course, require such sales to be at that
price.
Security transactions were permissible, so long as the lender did
not seek interest. One early form was that of giving the lender a
lease for years with a provision that he should have a fee if the loan
was not repaid by the expiration of the term.666 A later form was substantially that of the modem mortgage, a conveyance in fee simple
to the lender subject to a condition subsequent which entitled the
borrower to reenter upon payment of the debt or to a covenant by the
lender that he would reconvey the fee upon payment of the debt. 667
Under either form of mortgage the lender took possession immediately
upon the execution of the mortgage and held it until the debt was paid
in full. He was expected, in theory, to apply the entire rents and
profits in reduction of the debt. In practice, mortgagees must have contrived to make a surreptitious profit out of their possession of the mortgaged land or such transactions would not have been as common as they
were. In the condition type of mortgage in fee, the interest in the
land retained by the mortgagor was a mere right of entry. In the
covenant type his retained interest was a pure chose in action, a right
to sue for specific performance of the covenant. Neither of these
interests was alienable668 and neither entitled the mortgagor to possession until the debt was paid in full. If the debt was not paid in full
by the due date, the fee simple title of the mortgagee became absolute
and the mortgagor had nothing.
6615 LEGEs Enw. CoNFEssoms, c. 37 (1043; reenacted, 1066; ed. 1840); Stat. 15
Edw. III, stat. I, c. 5 (1341), 1 Statutes of the Realm 296; 3 Hen. VII, cc. 5, 6 (1487),
2 Statutes of the Realm 514, 515; 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 100-102
(1926).
6661 CoKE, lNsTITtJTEs 217a; 2 POLLOCK AND MArrr.ANn, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
BEFORE THE TIME oF EnwARD I, 25, 117-122 (1895); TURNER, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 18 (1931).
667 1 CoKE, lNsTITtJTEs 208a-208b; TororaR, THE EQUITY OF REDEMJ.>TION 18 (1931).
668 1 CoKE, lNsTITtJTEs, 210a; TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 19 (1931).
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As commercial activity increased the Church relaxed slightly in
its attitude toward credit transactions, permitting a lender to receive
damages if the debt was not paid on time, at least if he could show
that he suffered loss due to the default.669 By the fifteenth century it
was recognized that inability to take advantage of an opportunity for
a profitable investment constituted such loss. As a merchant or trader
could always show "loss" of this type, it became common to make
gratuitous loans for very short periods with a provision for payment
of interest in the form of liquidated damages, to begin on the nominal
due date of the loan. 670 In such a transaction neither party expected
that the debt would be paid on the nominal due date. These ecclesiastical relaxations of the prohibition on interest were reflected in an
English statute of 1494.671 Nevertheless, neither the Mediaeval
Church nor the mediaeval law permitted a loan of money upon interest
which was payable from the date of the loan.
The Protestant Reformation brought a change in attitude. Some
of the reformers, notably Calvin and Melancthon, approved of interest
at fair rates and it had become evident to many that to permit the
charging of interest at regulated rates was better than to drive borrowers to the use of subterfuges which really entailed greater expense
to them. A statute of 1545 permitted charging up to ten per cent per
annum interest on loans, including those secured by mortgage on
land. 672 Some Protestant leaders retained the mediaeval attitude toward
interest, however, and the statute was repealed in 1552.673 A statute
of 1623 permitted collection of interest at not to exceed eight per cent
669 O'BRIEN, AN EssAY ON Mm>IAEvAL EcoNoMic TEACHING 184-187 (1920). If
the penalty for default (poena con11entionalis) was stated in the instrument evidencing the
debt, the creditor could collect it without proof of damage; if not, he had the burden of
proving injury (damnum emergens). The loss usually shown was some calamity which
necessitated the creditor himself borrowing money.
670 Id. at 187-193; 8 HOLDSWORTH, HisTORY OP ENGLISH LAw 103 (1926). Compensation for this type of loss was callec:l "lu.crum cessans."
671 Stat. 11 Hen. VII, c. 8 (1494), 2 Statutes of the Realm 574.
672 Stat. 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §§3, 4 (1545); 8 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OP ENGLISH
LAw 108-109 (1926).
673 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 20 (1552). The statute imposed penalties of forfeiture of
the sum lent, imprisonment and fine for charging interest. The penalties were removed,
where the interest did not exceed 10%, by 13 Eliz. c. 8, §§2, 5, 9 (1570) and 39 Eliz.
c. 18, §§12, 33 (1-597), but these statutes did not permit collection of the interest.
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per annum674 and the charging of interest has been lawful, so far as
the secular government is concerned, since then.
The permission to charge interest made it possible for a mortgagee
to make a reasonable return on his investment without taking possession
of the land. In the seventeenth century it became common for the
mortgagee to permit the mortgagor to remain in possession until default. The mortgagor still had no right to possession in the absence of
express agreement. 675 So far as the law was concerned, the mortgagor
in possession was a mere tenant at will or for years of the mortgagee.676
At common law, if the mortgage debt was not paid on the due date, the
mortgagee became the absolute owner of the fee. 677
By default in payment on the due date, the mortgagor was likely
to lose his land for an inadequate consideration. In the course of the
seventeenth century the High Court of Chancery began to grant relief
from these forfeitures, considering that interest was adequate compensation to the mortgagee for delayed payment. The mortgagor who
had defaulted in payment and so had lost all his rights in the land at
law was permitted to sue in equity for redemption. Upon payment
of the debt, with interest, the mortgagee would be compelled to reconvey the land to the mortgagor. 678 The High Court of Chancery
did not, however, interfere with the mortgagee's right to possession
pending full redemption. 679 If the mortgage entitled him to possession from its date, he retained that right. If it entitled him to take
possession on default, he could still do so, and could keep possession
674 Stat. 21 Jae. I, c. 17, §2 (1623), made permanent, 3 Car. I, c. 4, §5 (1627). The
rate was reduced to 6% by 12 Car. II, c. 13, §2 (1660), and to 5% by 12 Anne, stat. 2,
c. 16, §1 (1713). All statutory restrictions on charging interest were repealed by 17-18
Viet. c. 90 (1854).
675 TORNER, THE EQtllTY OF Rm>EMPTION 88-90 (1931); see Christophers v. Sparke,
2 Jae. & W. 223 at 234, 37 Eng. Rep. 612 (1820).
676TORNER, THE EQtllTY OF REDEMPTION 91-105 (1931).
6771 CoKE, lNsTITUTEs 205a and Butler's Note 96 to 13th ed. (1787).
678 TORNER, THE EQUITY OF Rm>EMPTION 17-42 (1931); Master and Fellows 0£
Emanuel College, Cambridge, v. Evans, 1 Qhan. Rep. 18, 21 Eng. Rep. 494 (1625). As
a necessary corollary to this creation 0£ an equity 0£ redemption without definite limitation in duration, the High Court 0£ Chancery developed a correlative remedy for the mortgagee who wanted his money. He could sue for foreclosure 0£ the equity 0£ redemption,
that is, for a decree requiring the debtor to pay by a fixed date or lose his equity 0£
redemption through sale 0£ the land to satisfy the debt. How v. Vigures, 1 Chan. Rep.
32, 21 Eng. Rep. 499 (1628).
679 See Marquis Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Mer. 171, 359, 35 Eng. Rep. 905,
976 (1817).
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until redemption. The equity of redemption was only a right of the
mortgagor to pay the debt and recover the land after the due date
of the mortgage.
It will be recalled that, at law, the rights of the mortgagor under
the condition for reentry or covenant for reconveyance were personal
and inalienable. 680 In Chancery, however, the equity of redemption
became an equitable estate in land, equivalent in quantity to the
mortgagor's former legal estate. It was as freely alienable681 and
devisable682 as like legal estates. By the eighteenth century, Lord
Hardwicke could say,
"An equity of redemption has always been considered as an
estate in the land, for it may be devised, granted, or entailed with
remainders, and such entail and remainders may be barred by a
fine and recovery, and therefore cannot be considered as a mere
right only, but such an estate whereof there may be a seisin; the
person therefore intitled to the equity of redemption is considered
as the owner of the land, arid a mortgage in fee is considered as
personal assets."683
The High Court of Chancery would not countenance any provision in a mortgage which would defeat, clog or fetter the equity
of redemption. Lord Northington said:
"A mortgagee can never provide at the time of making the
loan for any event or condition on which the equity of redemption
shall be discharged, and the conveyance absolute. And there is
great reason and justice in this rule, for necessitous men are not
truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a present exigency, will
submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them." 684
From these principles it followed that any provision in a mortgage
680 Note

668 supra.
Notes 683, 686 infra. It was accessible, in equity, to the creditors of the mortgagor. Cole v. Warden, 1 Vern. 410, 23 Eng. Rep. 550 (1686); Plucknet v. Kirk, 1
Vern. 411, 23 Eng. Rep. 551 (1686).
682 Cooper v. Cooper, Nelson 153, 21 Eng. Rep. 813 (1689).
683 Casbome v. Scarfo, 1 Atk. 603 at 605, 26 Eng. Rep. 377 (1737).
There is
similar language in Frederick v. Aynscombe, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 594, 22 Eng. Rep. 499
(1667-1744).
684 Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden. 110 at 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838 (1762). Lord Hardwicke stated the rule in similar language in Toomes v. Conset, 3 Atk. 261, 26 Eng. Rep.
952 (1745), adding, "and the reason is, because it puts the borrower too much in the
power of the lender, who, being distressed at the time, is too inclinable to submit to any
terms proposed on the part of the lender."
681
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restricting devolution of the equity of redemption upon the death of
the mortgagor685 or restraining inter vivos alienation by him,686 is void.
Even a provision giving the mortgagee an option to purchase the land
for a fair price upon default is unenforceable. 687 As the mortgagee is
the legal owner of the land, his estate, too, is freely alienable. 688
Most American states now treat the mortgagor as the legal owner
of the land and the interest of the mortgagee as a mere lien. Where
this is so, the validity of restraints on alienation of the mortgagor's
interest is determined by the rules applicable to legal estates. Where
the equity of redemption remains an equitable estate, the Restatement
of Property takes the position that restraints on its alienation are valid
only if a like restraint would be valid as to an equivalent legal estate. 689
Such cases as there are appear to support this proposition. 690 Therefore,
if the equitable estate of the mortgagor is in fee simple, every prohibition on alienation or condition in general restraint of its alienation
is void.
Before the Statute of U ses691 legai possessory estates in land could
not be conveyed without a formal livery of seisin. In equity a bargain
and sale, that is, an executed contract of present sale, raised a use in the
bargainee. That is to say, although a mere agreement of present sale
and payment of the purchase price did not transfer the legal title, the
vendor stood seised to the use of the vendee. After the Statute of Uses
this use became a legal estate.692 In consequence, after the statute the
deed of bargain and sale became a common method of conveying the
legal title to land.
685 Anonymous, 2 Freeman 84, 22 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1681); Ord v. Smith, 2 Eq. Cas.
Abr. 600, 22 Eng. Rep. 504 (1725). In the latter case the mortgagor's heir was allowed
to redeem 26 years after default. The rule was otherwise at law. LTITLETON, TENURES,
§337 (1481).
686 Howard v. Harris, 1 Vern. 190, 23 Eng. Rep. 406 (1683); see Floyer v. Lavington, 1 P. Wms. 268, 24 Eng. Rep. 384 (1714).
687Willett v. Winnell, 1 Vern. 488, 23 Eng. Rep. 611 (1687); Jennings v. Ward, 2
Vern. 520, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705); Orby v. Trigg, 9 Mod. 2, 88 Eng. Rep. 276, 2
Eq. Cas. Abr. 599, 22 Eng. Rep. 503 (1722) (pre-emptive option).
688 Baker v. Kellet, 3 Ch. Rep. 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 717 (1668); Phillips v. Vaughan,
1 Vern. 336, 23 Eng. Rep. 504 (1685); Williams v. Springfield, 1 Vern. 476, 23 Eng.
Rep. 602 (1687).
689 Section 415 (1944).
690 Goddard, "Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31 l\hcH. L. REv 1 at
6-8 (1932); Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 400 (1850), note 136 supra.
601 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. IO (1535).
692 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557).
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In later centuries the High Court of Chancery, through the device
of granting specific performance of executory contracts for the sale of
land, developed the rights of the vendee under such a contract by
analogy to the old rights of the bargainee under an executed bargain
and sale. When a contract was entered into, binding the vendee to
pay the purchase price in the future and the vendor to convey upon
receipt of the price, the vendee became the owner in equity and the
vendor a sort of trustee of the legal title. Lord Hardwicke stated the
basis of the doctrine in these words:
"that which is contracted for valuable consideration to be done,
will by the court be considered as done; all the consequences
arising as if it had been so, and as if a conveyance had been made
of the land at the time to the vendee."693
In holding that the vendee bears the risk of loss by fire, Lord
Eldon said,
"for if the party by the contract has become in equity the owner
of the premises, they are his to all intents and purposes. They are
vendible as his, chargeable as his, capable of being incumbered as
his; they may be devised as his; they may be assets; and they
would descend to his heirs." 694
As these statements indicate, the rights of the vendee under an
executory contract for sale of land are not a mere chose in action, they
are an equitable estate in the land of the same duration as the legal
estate contracted for. This being so, the equitable estate of the vendee
is freely alienable and his transferee is entitled to specific performance
of the contract against the vendor. 695 As Lord Eldon put it,
"Being, as I say they were, the owners of the estate in equity,
they had a right . . . to sell such right, title, and interest as they
had. . . . It is extremely clear that an equitable interest under a
contract of purchase, may be the subject of sale." 696
693Attomey-General v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr. 218 at 220, 27 Eng. Rep. 992 (1748).
694 Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. 349 at 352, 31 Eng. Rep. 1088 (1801). See Capel v.
Girdler, 9 Ves. Jr. 509, 32 Eng. Rep. 700 (1804).
695 Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. Jr. 265, 32 Eng. Rep. 108 (1802); Wood v. Griffith, 1
Swans. 43, 36 Eng. Rep. 291 (1818); Nelthorpe v. Holgate, 1 Coll. 203, 63 Eng. Rep.
384 (1844); see Dyer v. Pulteney, Barn. C. 160, 27 Eng. Rep. 596 (1740); Anonymous
v. Walford, 4 Russ. 372, 38 Eng. Rep. 845 (1828).
696 Wood v. Griffith, note 695 supra, at 1 Swans. 53, 55-56, 36 Eng. Rep. 295
(1818).
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It will be apparent that, as developed by the High Court of
Chancery, the rights of a vendee under an executory contract for the
sale of land were virtually identical with those of a mortgagor under
the type of mortgage which was, in form, an absolute conveyance in
fee to a mortgagee who covenanted to reconvey upon payment of the
debt secured. In each case the legal title was held as security for a
debt and subject to a covenant to convey upon payment. In each
case the beneficiary of the covenant was entitled to specific performance of it upon payment and, pending payment, was treated as equitable owner of the land, with full power of alienation inter vivas and
by will. In each case the equitable owner was not entitled to possession
prior to payment in full unless the terms of the transaction gave him
such a right and, if they did, his possession was merely that of a tenant
for years or at will, subject to the restrictions which apply to such
tenancies. In each case equity deemed time not to be of the essence
and would compel conveyance even though the payment was not made
on time. 697 The one difference between them was that whereas, in
the case of a mortgage, the High Court of Chancery would never give
effect to any provision which tended to make time of the essence and
so shorten or cut off the equity of redemption, in the case of the
executory land contract, time could be made of the essence by express
stipulation. 698 Inasmuch as the typical English executory land contract contemplated a cash sale, so that cutting off the vendee's right to
performance upon default in payment deprived him only of the bargain and, perhaps, a small deposit, whereas cutting off an equity of
redemption meant allowing the mortgagee to have the land for an
inadequate price, this difference is understandable and appropriate.
The early Michigan cases treat the mortgage as it was treated in
England. The mortgagee was entitled to take possession of the land
upon default and to keep it until the mortgagor redeemed, without
bringing foreclosure proceedings, and equity would not interfere with
the mortgagee's doing so.699 The mortgagee could maintain an action
of ejectrnent immediately upon default, without foreclosing. 700 A
697 Seton

v. Slade, note 695 supra.
Ibid.
699 Stevens v. Brown, Walk. Ch. 41 (Mich. 1842); see Stout v. Keyes, 2 Dougl. 184
(Mich. 1845).
.
700 Mundy v. Momoe, 1 Mich. 68 (1848), holding Act 62, P.A. 1843, unconstitutional insofar as it puported to deprive mortgagees under mortgages executed before
698
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statute of 1843 changed the situation as to mortgages of land by
providing,
"That no action of ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by
a mortgagee or his assigns or representatives, for the recovery of the
mortgaged premises, until after a foreclosure of the mortgage, and
the time for redemption thereof shall have expired."701
The Michigan Supreme Court has given the statute a very broad
interpretation, holding that it prevents the mortgagee from taking
possession by self-help702 and that it invalidates every provision in a
mortgage which would give the mortgagee a right to possession or the
rents and profits before foreclosure and the expiration of the period
of redemption allowed therein.703 Michigan has adopted the view that
the mortgagor's interest is a legal estate and that of the mortgagee a
mere lien.704
its effective date of this right. As to chattel mortgages the old rule still prevails: the
mortgagee may bring replevin immediately upon default. Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3 Mich.
104 (1854).
701Act. 62, P.A. 1843; superseded by Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 108, §61, Comp. Laws
(1857) §4614; Comp. Laws (1871) §6263; How. Stat. §7847; Comp. Laws (1897)
§11006; reenacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 29, §54, Comp. Laws (1915) §13221; Comp.
Laws (1929) §14956; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1967; Comp. Laws (1948) §629.54, which
provides, "No action of ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by a mortgagee, or his
assigns or representatives, for the recovery of the mortgaged premises, until the title thereto
shall have become absolute upon the foreclosure of the mortgage."
102 Baker v. Pierson, 5 Mich. 456 (1858); Newton v. McKay, 30 Mich. 380 (1874);
Albright v. Cobb, 34 Mich. 316 (1876).
703 Hazeltine v. Granger, 44 Mich. 503, 7 N.W. 74 (1880); Nusbaum v. Shapero,
249 Mich. 252, 228 N.W. 785 (1930); Equitable Trust Co. v. Milton Realty Co., 261
Mich. 571, 246 N.W. 500 (1933); Bankers Trust Co. of Detroit v. Russell, 261 Mich.
579, 246 N.W. 504 (1933); American Trust Co. v. Michigan Trust Co., 263 Mich. 337,
248 N.W. 829 (1933); Equitable Trust Co. v. Wetsman, 264 Mich. 26, 242 N.W.
480 (1933); Lambrecht v. Lee, 264 Mich. 56, 249 N.W. 490 (1933); Detroit Trust Co.
v. Lipsitz, 264 Mich. 404, 249 N.W. 892 (1933); Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Witt,
264 Mich. 536, 250 N.W. 301 (1933); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Commercial
Realty Co., 265 Mich. 604, 251 N.W. 786 (1933); but see Michigan Trust Co. v.
Lansing Lumber Co., 103 Mich. 392, 61 N.W. 668 (1894); Kelly v. Bowerman, 113
Mich. 446, 71 N.W. 836 (1897); First National Bank of Ionia v. Gillam, 123 Mich. 112,
81 N.W. 979 (1900). Cf. Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Mich. 351 (1868); Wagar v. Stone, 36
Mich. 364 (1877); Beecher v. Marquette & Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 40 Mich. 307
(1879); Fifth National Bank v. Pierce, 117 Mich. 376, 75 N.W. 1058 (1898); Straus v.
Barbee, 262 Mich. 113, 247 N.W. 125 (1933); Bennos v. Waderlow, 291 Mich. 595,
289 N.W. 267 (1939); Lendzion v. Senstock, 300 Mich. 346, 1 N.W. (2d) 567 (1942).
The rule has been modified by a statute which permits a trust mortgage to contain an
assignment of rents and profits. Act 228, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) §§13498 to
13499; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1131, 26.1132; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.211, 554.212.
There are numerous cases construing the statute.
704 Dougherty v. Randall, 3 Mich. 581 (1855); Caruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich.
270 (1864); See Gorham v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247 at 250 (1871).
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Michigan follows the English rule that the vendee under an
executory contract for the sale of land is the equitable owner of the
land. 705 A land contract does not necessarily entitle the vendee to
possession and the act of 1843 has no application to land contracts.
Therefore, a provision in a land contract which authorizes the vendor
to take possession on default is valid.706 In consequence of these differences between the mortgage and the land contract it is common in
Michigan to effect credit sales of land by means of executory land
contracts instead of by conveyance to the vendee with purchase money
mortgage back to the vendor. There is no doubt that the interest of the
vendee under such a contract is alienable by assignment, sub-contract
or conveyance in the absence of valid restraints on alienation imposed
in the contract.707 The extent to which such restraints are effective
is not so clear.
Waiver of provisions in land contracts which required assignments
by the vendee to be made in a particular manner or only with the
consent of the vendor has been found in a number of cases, without
definite decision as to the validity of the provisions.708

Welling v. Strickland109 was a suit by the original vendee for specific performance of a land contract. The contract provided that the
vendee should not assign the contract or sublet the farm or any part
thereof without the written consent of the vendor and that any breach
would work an immediate forfeiture. The vendee sublet most of the
farm without permission and defaulted in payments. The vendor took
possession and notified the vendee that the contract was forfeited. Specific performance was denied, the opinion suggesting that the subletting alone was enough to work a forfeiture.
705 Bowen

v. Lansing, 129 Mich. 117, 88 N.W. 384 (1901).
v. Meloche, 113 Mich. 223, 71 N.W. 592 (1897); Smith v. Sherman,
265 Mich. 590, 251 N.W. 920 (1933); see Lendzion v. Senstock, 300 Mich. 346, 1 N.W.
(2d) 567 (1942). Cf. Batty v. Snook, 5 Mich. 231 (1858).
7o7 Brin v. Michalski, 188 Mich. 400, 154 N.W. 110 (1915); Range v. Davison, 242
Mich. 73, 218 N.W. 789 (1928).
7os Peters v. Canfield, 74 Mich. 498, 42 N.W. 125 (1889); Maday v. Roth, 160
Mich. 289, 125 N.W. 13 (1910); Henze v. Saunders, 215 Mich. 646, 184 N.W. 443
(1921); Distasio v. Gervasio, 234 Mich. 482, 208 N.W. 440 (1926); Mueller v. Bankers
Trust Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933); Whitley v. Tessman, 324
Mich. 215, 36 N.W. (2d) 724 (1949). Cf. Rathbun v. Herche, 323 Mich. 160, 35 N.W.
(2d) 230 (1948).
709 161 Mich. 235, 126 N.W. 471 (1910).
706 Belding
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Rodenhouse 11. DeGolia710 was a suit to rescind an assignment
of a land contract. In 1908 Langereis sold on land contract to Thomas.
In August 1913 Thomas sold to Vreeland by a sub-contract providing
that the vendee might not assign, transfer, lease or sublet without the
consent of the sub-vendor and for forfeiture on breach. Thomas later
assigned the sub-vendor's interest under the sub-contract to Langereis,
the original vendor. In 1915 Vreeland assigned the sub-vendee's
interest under the sub-contract to De Golia and the latter assigned it
to Rodenhouse. These assignments were made without the consent
of Langereis and he refused to recognize them. Rodenhouse then sued
De Golia to rescind the assignment to him. A decree granting recission
was affirmed.
Cutler 11. Lovinger711 was a suit for specific performance of a subcontract for sale of land. Milligan sold the land to the defendants by a
contract providing that they could not assign their interest without the
consent of the vendor. The defendants, without Milligan's consent,
contracted to assign their interest to the plaintiff. The defendants refused to perform on the ground Milligan would not consent. Milligan
testified that he was willing to convey to the defendants upon payment
of the balance due him. A decree for the plaintiff was affirmed, the
court saying that the defendants could bind themselves by a contract
to assign their interest even if an assignment would not be effective
against Milligan. This seems obvious. One who owns no interest in
land at all may bind himself by a contract to convey it. The decision
demonstrates that a provision against assignment in a land contract
will not be enforced as a prohibition on alienation in the sense that an
attempt by the vendee to alienate imposes no obligation upon him
whatever.
Hull 11. Hostettler712 was a suit for specific performance of a contract for exchange of lands. The defendants were to assign their interest
as vendees under a land contract which contained a covenant against
assignment without the consent of the vendor but no provision for
forfeiture on breach. The defendants executed such an assignment but
refused to complete the rest of the exchange. Their vendors intervened
110198 Mich. 402, 164 N.W. 488 (1917).
7U 212 Mich. 272, 180 N.W. 462 (1920).
112 224 Mich. 365, 194 N.W. 996 (1923).
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to assert a forfeiture of the contract for assignment without consent. A
decree granting specific performance was affirmed, the court holding
that such a provision against assignment does not prevent assignment
and does not give a right of forfeiture on breach in the absence of
specific provision therefor. The court implied that the vendors' remedy,
if any, was by action for breach of covenant. This is a clear decision
that a provision against assignment in a land contract will not be
enforced as a prohibition on alienation. If valid at all, it can only be
as a penalty restraint.
Porter 11. Barrett718 was a summary proceeding for possession of
land. The plaintiffs sold land to Parent by a contract which provided,
"This land is sold upon express condition that the ... same shall never
be sold or rented to a colored person." Parent assigned to Barrett with
the consent of the vendors. Barrett, by separate executory contract,
sold the land to Robinson, a colored person. The plaintiffs asserted
a forfeiture for breach of the condition. A judgment for the defendants
on procedural grounds was affirmed on the ground the condition was
void as an illegal restraint on alienation of an estate in fee simple.
William F. Nance Realty Co. 11. Wood-Wardowski Co.714 was a
suit to set aside foreclosure of a land contract and for specific performance. The defendants sold land to Nance by a contract which provided,
"no assignment or conveyance by the purchaser shall create any
liability whatsoever against the seller until a duplicate thereof duly
witnessed and acknowledged, together with the residence address
of such assignee, shall be delivered to the seller and receipt thereof
indorsed hereon."
Nance quit-claimed his interest to the plaintiff corporation, of
which he was president, without compliance with the quoted provision. There having been default in payments, the defendant instituted summary proceedings against Nance and secured a judgment
of restitution. The amounts due were not paid within the grace period
allowed by the statute authorizing such proceedings.715 A decree dis718 233

Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925). Also discussed above at note 158.
242 Mich. 110, 218 N.W. 680 (1928) ..
715 Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 30, §25, as amended by Act 243, P.A. 1917; Comp. Laws
(1915) §13253; amended, Act 373, P.A. 1927; Comp. Laws (1929) §14988; amended,
Act 122, P.A. 1933; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1999; Comp. Laws (1948) §630.25. The grace
period was 30 days when this case was decided. It was increased to 90 days by the 1933
amendment.
714
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missing the bill was affirmed. The decision does not enforce a forfeiture for violation of the provision against assignment; it merely
holds that the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief from forfeiture for default in payments.
Sloman 11. Cutler716 was an action of assumpsit for payments due
under a land contract. The plaintiffs, husband and wife, sold land
of the husband by a contract providing that the vendee might not
assign without the consent of the vendors and for forfeiture on breach.
The vendee assigned his interest to the defendant who, in consideration of the plaintiff husband's consent to the assignment, assumed
performance of the vendee's obligations. The defendant contended
that the provision against assignment was a void restraint on alienation
and, therefore, that the consent to assignment was not consideration
for his undertaking. A judgment for the defendant was reversed, the
court holding that such a restraint on assignment is valid while the
contract remains executory as a protection to the vendor's security
interest.
Jankowski 11. Jankowski717 was a suit to restrain summary proceedings for possession of land. The defendants sold land to the plaintiffs
Jankowski by a contract which provided that the vendees should not
assign or convey their interest or any part thereof without the consent
of the vendors and for forfeiture on breach. The plaintiffs Jankowski,
without the consent of the vendors, sold their interest by subcontract
to the plaintiffs De Courval and later assigned the head contract to
the De Courvals. The vendors declared a forfeiture for breach of the
non-assignment clause and commenced the summary proceedings in
question. A decree granting specific performance to the plaintiffs
De Courval was affirmed. The court repeated the statement made in
the opinion in Sloman 11. Cutler that restrictions on assignment in a
land contract are valid while the contract remains executory, "for the
reason that the seller has a right to see that the property is kept in the
hands of a responsible person,"718 but held that equitable relief from
forfeiture under the facts of the case was appropriate.
716 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932). Accord: Zeidler v. Burlingame, 260
Mich. 596, 245 N.W. 527 (1932); Windmill Point Land Co. v. Jackson, 269 Mich.
50, 256 N.W. 619 (1934).
111 311 Mich. 340, 18 N.W. (2d) 848 (1945).
718 Id. at 344.
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The opinion in Sloman v. Cutler is the most extended discussion
which the Michigan Supreme Court has made of the validity of provisions in land contracts restraining assignment. It was based on an
amicus curiae brief prepared by Professor Edwin C. Goddard of the
University of Michigan Law School, who later published his view
that such provisions are valid.719 His argument is by analogy to the
lease for years, pointing out that the land contract vendor has an interest
similar to that of the lessor in preventing waste. Professor Goddard
was careful to observe, however, that "most cases hold that when the
assignee tenders to the vendor full performance of the contract the vendor can no longer object,"720 which points to the fact that the vendee
under a long-term executory land contract, like the mortgagor under the
English decisions, has two distinct interests. One interest is purely
legal. It includes his right at common law to have possession pending
full payment, which is merely a legal estate for years, and his right to
sue the vendor at law for damages for breach of contract. This legal
interest may properly be made subject to strict forfeiture on alienation.
The other interest, the right to specific performance in equity of the
vendor's covenant to convey in fee upon full payment, is an equitable
fee simple, alienation of which should not be subject to restraint by any
condition or penalty whatever.721
An example will demonstrate the inequity of permitting forfeiture
of the equitable fee. A professional man purchases a home on executory
land contract for a total price of $20,000, payable in instalments. When
he has paid $19,000, his health fails and he is unable to pay the balance.
He assigns his interest to another who immediately tenders payment of
the full balance. To allow the vendor to forfeit the contract, take back
the house, and keep the $19,000, would be grossly unfair. If he has
such rights he is likely to exact a heavy pecuniary mulct for his consent
to assignment; in effect, to get a larger price than that for which he
719 "Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31 MICH. L. RBv. 1-15 (1932).
See Grismore, "Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract," 31 MICH. L. RBv. 299
at 316-319 (1933). Cf. CoRNBLIUS, I.Aw OF LAND CONTRACTS §§172, 173 (1922). Mr.
Cornelius expresses understanding of the harshness and inequity of strict enforcement of
such provisions. It is not solely a problem of logic but of the lives and life savings of
people of modest means.
720 31 MICH. L. RBv. 1 at 13 (1932).
721 This is substantially the position taken by the PROPERTY RBsTATBMI!N'l' §416 and
comment e.
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agreed to sell. It was to prevent just such exactions that the statute
Quia Emptores Terrarum722 was enacted.
The decision in Jankowski v. Jankowski indicates that the Michigan
Supreme Court appreciates the problem and has not forgotten its great
decision in Mandlebaum v. McDonell. 728 Nevertheless, the field of
equitable relief against forfeiture of land contracts will require much
extension and development before the land contract purchaser attains
the degree of protection against oppression which courts of equity have
afforded the mortgagor since the seventeenth century.
722

18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290); notes 6, 104 supra.
Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra.
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